Skip to navigation – Site map

From Warhorses to Warheads

Revisiting Quwwa in Q 8: 60 in Classical and Modern Egyptian Exegetical Tradition
Elsayed M. A. Amin
p. 83-129

Abstracts

This paper analyses the views of selected classical and modern Egyptian exegetes regarding the interpretation of quwwah (power) in the Q 8: 60. This verse is highlighted in this paper due to specific reasons that are attributed to extreme understandings and practices by some Muslims and non-Muslims in our modern times. It is based on the study of seven Sunnā authored works attributed to eight exegetes. Four from the classical period, which include al-abarī (d. 310/922), al-Rāzī (d. 606/1209), al-Qurubī (d. 617/1272), and al-Alūsī (d. 1270/1854). Four from the modern period mostly Egyptian interpreters, which include ‘Abdu (d. 1323/1905), Riā (d. 1353/1935), Qub (d. 1385/1966), and al-Ša‘rāwī (d. 1419/1998). The selected works have been published from the first quarter of the 2nd/8th century up to the end of the 20th century. It investigates the role played by modern al-Azhar scholars in refuting extremist ideas concerning biased interpretations of the Qurʾān, with special reference to the Q 8: 60. It critiques the current role played by the institution, and open vistas for the necessity of future research within the domain of modern Qurʾān interpretations and their relationship to political ethics.

Top of page

Full text

(وَأَعِدُّوا لَهُمْ مَا اسْتَطَعْتُمْ مِنْ قُوَّةٍ وَمِنْ رِباطِ الْخَيْلِ تُرْهِبُونَ بِهِ عَدُوَّ اللَّهِ وَعَدُوَّكُمْ وَآخَرِينَ مِنْ دُونِهِمْ لا تَعْلَمُونَهُمُ اللَّهُ يَعْلَمُهُمْ وَما تُنْفِقُوا مِنْ شَيْءٍ فِي سَبِيلِ اللَّهِ يُوَفَّ إِلَيْكُمْ وَأَنْتُمْ لا تُظْلَمُون) (الأنفال 60:8)

“Prepare whatever forces you [believers] can muster, including warhorses, to frighten off God’s enemies and yours, and warn others unknown to you but known to God. Whatever you give in God’s cause will be repaid to you in full, and you will not be wronged.” (Al-Anfāl 8:60)

Introduction

  • 1 Schwartz-Barcott, War, Terror and Peace in the Qurʾan and in Islam, p. 2-4.

1Since September 11, 2001, many Qurʾanic verses are quoted out of their original contexts in order to suit ideological and political agendas of Muslim and non-Muslim individuals and groups whose objective is to disseminate fear and terror in our already troubled world.1 Qurʾanic exegeses, both classical and modern, constitute main sources from which such individuals and groups formulate their arguments. Among the Qurʾanic verses surrounded by a great deal of controversy is Qurʾān 8: 60. This verse is misquoted partially or wholly to justify politically and religiously-motivated ideologies, agendas and beliefs.

  • 2 According to Habeck, “based on one verse in the Quran [i.e. Qurʾan 8: 60] as well as few ahadith, t (...)
  • 3 Sometimes referred to as theGroupin this paper. The reason for specifically referring to the Gr (...)
  • 4 Spindārī, al-Irhāb min manẓūr qurʾānī, p. 34.
  • 5 Martin and Smith, Every Kingdom Divided Against Itself Will Be Ruined”, p. 674. All renderings of (...)
  • 6 Wilders published a film on the Internet under the title “Quran License to Kill”. The film was late (...)
  • 7 “Response to Wilders’ Anti-Koran Film: Saudi Blogger Releases Christian Version of ‘Fitn”, <http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,546534,00.html> accesse</http> (...)
  • 8 According to John Tyler, “a party that calls Islam a backward religion, wants a ban on headscarves (...)
  • 9 Nielsen, “The Discourse of ‘Terrorism’ Between Violence, Justice and International Order”, p. 17.

2Various reasons undergird the selection of the verse as a topic of this research. First, the verse has been widely quoted by some extremist groups2 namely al-Ǧamāʿa al-Islāmiyya (Islamic Group, IG) in Egypt,3 before the group declared its initiative to halt violence as will be shown in the discussion below, as a pretext for subduing non-Muslims to Muslim rule, as well as killing unbelievers unjustifiably. Surprisingly, a statement quoting the verse attributed to the current Egyptian repentant commander who was once an ideologue of the IG Sayyid Imām al-Šarīf (famously known as Dr Fal), reads: “al-irhāb min al-islām wa man ankara ḏālika faqad kafara” (Terrorism is part of Islam and whoever denies that has, indeed, become an unbeliever).4 While the IG in Egypt has declared repentance, terrorist groups such as al-Qaeda unfortunately still embrace the same extremist interpretation.5 Second, this verse was widely quoted in world media after being recited in Arabic and inaccurately translated into English in order to justify a fierce campaign in which the Qurʾān has been falsely portrayed, in the controversial short film Fitna by the Dutch right-wing MP Geert Wilders, as a “fascist book” calling for killing all unbelievers.6 In a reaction to Wilders’ biased attitude, which is clearly demonstrated in his film, the Muslim response ranged from similar counter-productive accusations in which certain biblical verses were, unfortunately, taken out of their context in reactionary fashion7 to media responses. Lamentably, Wilders’ political party is on the rise, as are such Islamophobic campaigns.8 As of yet, according to my exhaustive survey, no detailed academic response has been written to examine the IG or Wilders’ quotation of the verse under discussion. Third, the Qurʾān 8: 60 is apparently the only verse in which, according to Jørgen S. Nielsen, “…the Qurʾānic term that provides the modern Arabic word for terrorism, irhāb…can be—and actually is—used as a justification for terrorism”.9

  • 10 In many occurrences, reaching a comprehensive understanding of some verses cannot be done except th (...)

3A closer look at the topical verse reveals that it has three seemingly separate yet connected themes; First, quwwa (power, strength, force) and warhorses (ribāṭ al-ḫayl) as one of its main manifestations. Second, rahba (fear, deterrence) and its targeted audience. Third, infāq (spending in the cause of Allāh). This paper will limit itself to addressing the first theme in detail. While the second and third themes have also direct relevance to the wide misinterpretation of the verse, they will be explained in part two of this article. Importantly, the three themes are neither sufficiently nor adequately addressed due to exclusivist understandings of the verse. Because most of the discussion below will depend on selected words from the verse, a reference will also be made to exploring meanings of these words in other Qurʾanic occurrences in a way that helps better understanding of the verse itself.10

  • 11 For a biography of al-abarī and his exegesis, see, for example, al-Faramāwī, “al- abarī”, p. 551- (...)
  • 12 For a biography of al-Rāzī and his exegesis, see, for example, al-Maǧdūb, al-Imām al-akīm Faḫr al- (...)
  • 13 For a biography of al-Qurubī and his exegesis, see, for example, al-Faramāwī, “al- Qurubī”, p.h83 (...)
  • 14 For a biography of al-Alūsī and his exegesis, see al-Bayyūmī, “al-Alūsī al-Mufassir”, p. 13-18; al- (...)
  • 15 For a biography of ʿAbdu, see, for example, Cragg, “ʿAbdū, Muammad”, vol. 1, p. 11 f.; ʿImāra, “Mu(...)
  • 16 For a biography of Ria, see, for example, ʿImāra, “Muammad Rašīd Ria”,p. 946 f.; Širbāsī, Rašīd (...)
  • 17 For a biography of Qub and his exegesis, see for example, Akhavi, Qub, Sayyid, vol. 3, p. 400-4 (...)
  • 18 For a biography of al-Šaʿrāwī and his exegesis, see, for example, “al-Bayyūmī, Muammad Mutawallī a (...)
  • 19 For the various types of Qurʾanic exegesis and their definitions, see Abdul-Raof, Schools of Qurʾan (...)

4Because it is practically infeasible to revisit the quwwa in Qurʾān 8: 60 in light of all works that have been published under the label of tafsīr, this article attempts to provide a survey of four selected classical works of the tafsīrs of al-abarī (d. 310/922),11 al-Rāzī (d. 606/1209),12 al-Qurubī (d. 617/1272),13 and al-Alūsī (d. 1270/1854).14 Three other modern Egyptian works of tafsīr by four authors are also examined. They are ʿAbdu (d. 1323/1905),15 Riā (d. 1353/1935),16 Qub (d. 1385/1966),17 and al-Šaʿrāwī (d. 1419/1998).18 The selected works are written by Sunni exegetes and have been published from the first quarter of the 2nd/8th century up to the end of the 20th century. All of them are written in Arabic and are not translated except for Qub’s tafsīr. All of them provide analytical exegesis (al-tafsīr al-taḥlīlī) which is also called verse-by-verse/sequential exegesis (al-tafsīr al-musalsal). This paper will make use of this type of tafsīr along with comparative exegesis (al-tafsīr al-muqāran), in which the views of exegetes regarding a specific verse(s) are analytically compared, and thematic exegesis (al-tafsīr al-mawḍūʿi), in which the verse(s) in one or more sūra thought to share the same theme are collected together for purposes of exegetical analysis.19

5Moreover, the discussion will not limit itself to the views of the eight exegetes above, but will also include the opinions of some modern scholars whose views are juxtaposed with the views of the exegetes to give a more comprehensive understanding of quwwa in the verse under discussion.

  • 20 According to al-Faramāwī, al-Rāzi’s focus on thematic exegesis at that time was an interest that di (...)

6The rationale for selecting the above classical exegetes is due to the following reasons: first, many, if not all, of the modern extremist groups quote the four classical exegetes selected here, especially al-abarī and al-Qurubī, in order to establish authority for their claims about killing non-Muslims unjustifiably. Second, the classical commentaries are widely critiqued by many Western scholars, especially with regard to their views about Muslim/non-Muslim relations. It may be that they, unlike others, witnessed historical periods in which the relations between Muslims and non-Muslims were hostile. Therefore, their interpretations were a reflection of their reality. Third, some of the classical commentators consulted, especially al-Rāzī, would remarkably blend more than one type of tafsīr together such as al-tafsīr al-taḥlīlī and al-tafsīr al-mawḍūʿī.20 Both types are consulted in this paper, as earlier stated. Fourth, classical exegetes, especially al-Alūsī, took special interest to explain various religious terms, which may indicate that his exegesis also contributes, albeit indirectly, to thematic exegesis; a thing about which the verse in question is concerned.

  • 21 Pink, “Tradition and Ideology in Contemporary Sunnite Qurʾan Exegesis”, p. 8.
  • 22 Al-Azhar, according to Jansen, is “…traditionally regarded as the intellectual bulwark of Islam” an (...)

7As for the modern Egyptian commentators, various other reasons can also be given. First, Egypt is a leading Muslim country in publishing Sunni commentaries of the Qurʾān as well as a centre of publishing religious literature for the Arab world.21 Second, and perhaps unsurprisingly, three of the modern Egyptian commentaries were written by professional scholars who hold faculty positions in different disciplines of Šarīʿa. Some of them, like ʿAbduh and al-Šaʿrāwī, assumed al-Azhar posts in Egypt, as muftīs or ministers of religious affairs. Qub is the only modern Egyptian commentator who did not attend al-Azhar institutes and university.22 Perhaps he is the only one who has ideological inclinations over which there has been much controversy until today. Being an ideologue of the Muslim Brotherhood of his time as well as being affiliated with oppositional Muslim groups, some of whom had adopted extremism, necessitates consulting his commentary. Third, al-Azhar modern exegetes from ʿAbdu to al-Šaʿrāwī and many other modern scholars consulted in this article present a moderate and mainstream understanding of the Qurʾān; which is considered a refutation to biased and extremist interpretations of the Qurʾān, in general and the Qurʾān 8: 60, in particular. Fourth, al-Šaʿrāwī was engaged in brokering peace between the Egyptian government and the IG group of the time, some of whose members called for the unleashed use of quwwa to attack and frighten non-Muslim-something which necessitates consulting al-Šaʿrāwī’s interpretation.

Sūra in Wider Qurʾānic Context

  • 23 For a comprehensive account of this important battle in Islamic history see Hamidullah, The Battlef (...)
  • 24 Al-abarī, Ǧāmiʿ al-bayān ʿan taʾwīl āyāt al-Qurʾān, vol. 9, p. 172 f. See also, al-Ġazālī, Naḥwa t(...)

8While this article’s point of departure is the Qurʾānic fragment, 8: 60, it is necessary to briefly locate the sūra (pl. suwar), where the verse under discussion is textually mentioned in its wider Qurʾānic context. Like verses (āyāt pl. āya), which are often linked to particular occasions of revelations (asbāb al-nuzūl), sūras are also usually linked to particular circumstances and historical events justifying their whole or partial revelations. Sūra 8 is entitled al-Anfāl (The Spoils of War). The celebrated exegete al-abarī (d. 310/923) recounts a number of traditions that linked the revelation of the first verse of al-Anfāl, and perhaps the subsequent verses, to the wake of the Muslim’s triumph at the Battle of Badr23 (17 Ramadan 2/18 November 623).24

  • 25 Q 8: 1-4.
  • 26 Q 8: 72-75.

9Al-Anfāl begins with a moral lesson in a question-answer form for believers not to concern themselves much with how the anfāl should be distributed. Rather, they should strive to please God and build social harmony among themselves as true believers.25 Interestingly, the sūra draws to a close with various admonitions for the believers with particular emphasis on attaining jihad financially and physically for the cause of Allāh.26

  • 27 Al-Alūsī, Rūḥ al-maʿānī fī tafsīr al-Qurʾan al-ʿaẓīm, vol. 10, p. 41.
  • 28 Al-Suyūī, Tanāsuq al-durar fī tanāsub al-suwar, p. 88-91. See also, al-aqafī, āl-Burhān fī tanāsu (...)

10Al-Anfāl is viewed by the Egyptian al-Suyūī (d. 911/1505) as more attached thematically to its succeeding (Q: 9) and not preceding sūra (Q: 7). He mentioned some reasons to substantiate his claim. First, some verses in both sūras communicate similar messages. The Q 8: 60 and 9: 46, according to him, are two verses calling for preparing necessary forces before entering the battlefield. However, neither classical exegetes nor modern Egyptian ones attempted to link the two verses in both sūras, even indirectly. Second, both Q: 8 and Q: 9, unlike all other sūras, are not separated by the basmala and are, therefore, according to the late classical exegete al-Alūsī treated as one sūra.27 This is because they share various themes such as fighting and the attitude to be followed by Muslims with those who break peaceful treaties with them. While this view looks harmonious, it is challenged by Qub who tried to depict verses of the Q: 8 and Q: 9 as referring to different transitional texts (marḥaliyya) and final (nihāʾiyya) texts, as will be explained below. Third, both sūras, according to al-Suyūī, communicate similar topics stating that the Q 8: 41 named the due recipients of the anfāl, whereas the Q 9: 60 specified the due recipients of alms.28 This view, however, is questioned. This is because, first, the spoils of war and the alms are two different categories with, of course, different due recipients. Second, the way and circumstances concerning the distribution of each are also different. Therefore, there is no common denominator between the two to say that both sūras are thematically interconnected.

  • 29 Ibid., p. 89.

11The polymath al-Suyūī seemingly penned his treatise with the attempt to find organic unity (munāsaba) among sūras and āyas of the Qurʾān, in general. His attempt to link the Q: 8 and Q: 9 on different chapter-verse levels, is, however, questionable and remarkably selective. This is because al-Suyūī himself stated that the current arrangement (tartīb) of the Q: 8 and Q: 9 was not done according to Muammad’s (d. 11/632) directives, but rather an individual interpretation (iǧtihād) by ʿUthmān b. ʿAffān (d. 35/655).29

12Classical exegetes, with the exception of the brief interpretative attempt of al-Alūsī, did not take much interest in discussing whether or not the Q: 8 is more attached thematically to its preceding or succeeding sūra. Following their suit, modern Egyptian ones, with the exception of Qub, adopted the same attitude. Ironically, Riā (1865-1935), quoted the view of al-Alūsi, referred to above, without attempting to question its relevance or applicability.

13A radically different view, which tried to disassociate common themes between the Q: 8 and Q: 9, but this time with particular focus on the nature of war and peace verses in both sūras, is maintained by Qub.

  • 30 Qub, ilāl al-Qurʾān, vol. 3, p. 1580-1582; idem, In the Shade of the Qurʾan, vol. 8, p. 24 f.

14Heavily depending on Q: 9 in formulating his argument, Qub argues that two stages mark the interpretation of Qurʾānic verses related to peace and war. These two stages can be divided into: al-nuṣūṣ al-marḥaliyya (transitional texts) and al-nuṣūṣ al-nihāʾiyya (final texts). For him, the transitional texts include, for example, Q 8: 61, which is the succeeding verse of the Q 8: 60 and 60: 8. These verses instruct Muslims to remain patient, even while under oppression. Muslims are also asked to maintain peaceful co-existence and tolerance in their relations with non-Muslims. These two verses and others similar to them in meaning, Qub argues, are limited to specific circumstances that have appeared and may appear in certain eras in the life of the Muslim umma (community of Muslims worldwide). However, he insists that while these ‘transitional texts’ are applicable in certain periods of time, they do not constitute the definitive rulings upon which relations between Muslims and non-Muslims are established. The Muslim umma is required to remove all obstacles in order to pave the way for the final texts to dominate the scene. By these final texts Q 9: 1-5 and 29 are meant as the verses that finally determine, according to his view, the shape of the relations between Muslims and non-Muslims. He further argues that Muslims should not twist the contexts of the final texts to make them applicable to the transitional texts.30

15To give credibility to his revolutionary views above, Qub did his best to refute the views of those who maintain that peaceful co-existence and tolerance are the norm of the relation between Muslims and non-Muslims. Qub’s view of Riā will only be highlighted because al-Manār is, perhaps, the only modern Egyptian exegesis that paid special attention to this point. It is noteworthy that al-Šaʿrāwī did not draw any conclusions from Qub’s refutations. Perhaps he did not want to burden his TV audience with them.

  • 31 Qub, ilāl, vol. 3, p. 1588 f.; idem, In the Shade, vol. 8, p. 41.
  • 32 Qub, Fī ẓilāl, vol. 3, p. 1589-1592; idem, In the Shade, vol. 8, p. 41-46. See also, Bin Jani, Say (...)

16Riā has his share of Qutb’s criticism. After quoting Riā’s view in al-Ẓilāl,31 Qub refuses to accept that the final texts do not constitute the underlying principle, as Riā maintained. Qub argues that Riā—like many other modernist exegetes and authors who have found themselves with no choice but to yield to the dominating power of unbelievers—supports an apologetic interpretation the aim of which is to present Islam as a religion of peace, whose main concern is to secure peace within its boundaries and whose followers hasten to declare truces and sign peaceful treaties, whenever possible.32

  • 33 Burgat, Islamism in the Shadow of al-Qaeda, p. 104; Bonney, Jihad: From the Qurʾan to Bin Laden, p. (...)

17Here, it is interesting to note that Qub introduced the idea of transitional and final texts. More significantly, in contrast to the common view that states that Qub was considerably influenced by al-Mawdūdī (d. 1979),33 he was actually influenced by the medieval narrative of jihad linked to Ibn Taymiyya (661-728/1263-1328). Interestingly, like the classical exegetes, Qub’s interpretation of jihad favours its offensive aspect. In his interpretation, Qub seemingly insists on disregarding modernist interpretations especially al-Manār, which views peace—and not war—as the underlying principle of external relations between Muslims and non-Muslims.

  • 34 According to al-Zuaylī, this dichotomous classification is postulated by the majority of classical (...)
  • 35 Because it is beyond the scope and capacity of this article to cite and then evaluate all the class (...)
  • 36 According to Haykal, dār al-ḥarb or dār al-kufr is: “The country that is not governed by the Muslim (...)
  • 37 Bin Jani, Sayyid Qutb’s View of Jihad, p. 346.

18According to Qub’s narrative, there is no territory beyond the classical dichotomous classification of the world34 into what is famously known as dār al-islām35 (territory of Islam) and dār al- ḥarb36 (territory of war); a reason why his detractors regard his narrative as reductionist—because of its binary vision, which overrules other visions advocated by other modern exegetes, namely Riā.37

  • 38 Kepel, Beyond Terror and Martyrdom, p. 161.

19Indeed, the historical and circumstantial contextualization which gave rise to the above radical view of Qub cannot be underestimated. Qub wrote most of the Ẓilāl in prison, and was later executed. This could account for his ideas being understood as “fairly general statements” that lack direct elaboration, as his execution actually prevented him from expanding on them.38

  • 39 Al-Qaraāwī, “almotamar.net”, <http://www.almotamar.net/news/10244.htm accessed on April29, 2013. S (...)
  • 40 Al-Qaraāwī, “Kalima aīra awla Sayyid Qub”, <http://www.qaradawi.net/articles/86-2009-12-12-10-35-10/4143.html>; accessed on April 29, 2013. See also, Soage, “ (...)

20Al-Qaraāwī, while criticizing Qub’s view above as being selective,39 sympathetically adds that if Qub had managed to lead a normal life outside the confines of prison, and had he managed to mix with other scholars of his time in such a way that mutual interaction and constructive criticism were applied, he might have relinquished his radical views. This is because Qub, according to al-Qaraāwī, was famously known as a staunch advocate of truth, who would never accept to compromise his religion.40

  • 41 For details of the dramatic historical events Egypt witnessed at that time, see, for example, Kenne (...)

21Here, the views of al-Qaraāwī, as well as Kepel on Qub may be deemed well-balanced because they do not overlook the harsh circumstances41 under which the man lived in the shade of a despotic Egyptian regime prior to his execution.

  • 42 Riā, Tafsīr al-Qurʾān al-akīm: āl-muštahir bi-ism Tafsīr al-Manār, vol. 9, p. 581; Qub, In the S (...)

22It can be deduced from Qub’s thesis regarding al-nuṣūṣ al-maḥaliyya vs. al-nuṣūṣ al-nihāʾiyya, that he, unlike all other modern Egyptian exegetes, tried to disassociate both sūras, at least on verse level, to prove that peace is not the norm of the relationship between Muslims and non-Muslims. His interpretation reveals that both sūras seem to belong to different historical periods. However, the two sūras belong to Madinan revelations. Of the classical and modern exegetes, only Riā and Qub share the view that Q: 8 is a Madinan sūra except for few verses related to particular events which took place in Makka. Other classical and modern Egyptian exegetes pay scant attention to this point. According to Riā and Qub, some reports state that verses from thirty to thirty five of Q: 8 are revealed in Makka because they belong to the plot of the People of Quraysh against Muammad as well as some events which took place in Makka before the latter’s emigration to Madina.42

Āyā in Wider Sūra Context

  • 43 Abdul-Raof, The Qurʾan Outlined: Outline, Theme and Text, p. 27.
  • 44 According to el-Mesawi, “Madinan revelations must be seen as a continuation and elaboration of Makk (...)
  • 45 For more information on the nature of the conflict between Muammad and these Jewish tribes see Sch (...)
  • 46 Al-abarī, Ǧāmiʿ al-bayān, vol. 10, p. 25-29; al-Rāzī, al-Tafsīr al-kabīr aw mafātīḥ al-ġayb, vol.  (...)
  • 47 Translation of Qurʾanic verses are taken from M.A.S Abdel Haleem’s translation.

23The verse under discussion is a purely Madinan verse in a predominantly Madinan sūra.43 It is, therefore, excluded from the exegetical disagreement over Makkan/Madinan verses in Q: 8.44 Locating the Q 8: 60 in its wider sūra context reveals that verses from 55 to 63 constitute what may be termed as ‘a unified thematic segment’ within the sūra. To understand the verse fully, it is, therefore, essential to look at it in that wider verse context. This fact, however, is, unfortunately, overlooked or not paid due attention to by some members of the IG, other extremist groups, and Wilders’ Fitna film whose quotations of the verse under discussion is selective. These verses, according to all consulted classical and modern exegeses, refer to different reports which speak of several Bedouin Arabs and the triad Jewish tribes which traditionally include Banū Qaynuqāʿ, Banū al-Naḍīr, and Banū Qurayẓa,45 who break their treaties with Muammad several times, one after the other, before and after the Battle of Badr.46 Therefore, the passage of Q 8: 60 represents the nexus of how the previous allies who break their treaties with Muammad and his followers should be dealt with. In its very wording, the verse as a whole, which is misquoted today, calls upon Muammad and his companions to prepare necessary forces with which they can deter their former allies-turned-enemies. The verse reads as follows:47

(وَأَعِدُّوا لَهُمْ مَا اسْتَطَعْتُمْ مِنْ قُوَّةٍ وَمِنْ رِباطِ الْخَيْلِ تُرْهِبُونَ بِهِ عَدُوَّ اللَّهِ وَعَدُوَّكُمْ وَآخَرِينَ مِنْ دُونِهِمْ لا تَعْلَمُونَهُمُ اللَّهُ يَعْلَمُهُمْ وَما تُنْفِقُوا مِنْ شَيْءٍ فِي سَبِيلِ اللَّهِ يُوَفَّ إِلَيْكُمْ وَأَنْتُمْ لا تُظْلَمُونَ) (الأنفال 60:8)

  • 48 Abdel Haleem, The Qurʾan: A New Translation, p. 114.

“Prepare whatever forces you [believers] can muster, including warhorses, to frighten off God’s enemies and yours, and warn others unknown to you but known to God. Whatever you give in God’s cause will be repaid to you in full, and you will not be wronged.”48 (Al-Anfāl 8:60)

Quwwa in the Qurʾān

  • 49 Knysh, “Power and Impotence”, vol. 4, p. 210.
  • 50 Ibn Manūr, Lisān al-ʿArab, vol. 15, p. 206-209; al-Afahānī, Mufradāt alfāẓ al-Qurʾān, p. 693 f.; (...)
  • 51 Ibn Manūr, Lisān, vol. 15, p. 210-212.

24The verbal root q.w.y and its derivatives occur forty-two times in the Qurʾān in various lexical forms such as qawiyy (mighty, strong) and quwā (mighty powers), quwwa, and muqwīn (the needy, the destitute). The term and its derivatives are used in the Qurʾān mostly to mean the possession of authority over others and the ability to dominate and impose one’s will.49 In this regard, eleven main meanings can be identified. First, God’s mighty power (2: 165; 11: 66; 22: 74). Second, the power of the angels (53: 5; 81: 20). Third, the power of the jinn (27: 39). Fourth, affluence (11: 52). Fifth, strength in general (30: 54). Sixth, determination (2: 63; 7: 171). Seventh, physical power (28: 76). Eighth, seeking assistance (11: 80; 18: 95). Ninth, general preparations before meeting the enemy, archery (8: 60). Tenth, firmness, tightness (16:92). Eleventh, the needy, the destitute (56: 73).50 The eleventh meaning of muqwīn, according to Ibn Manūr (d. 711/1311), refers to travellers who are forced to reside in the desert or to stay in a barren land, people with scarce resources, the poor, and the weak.51 Strikingly, muqwīn is the only derivative whose meaning is seemingly opposite to the predominant meanings of quwwa in the Qurʾān including, of course, the Q 8: 60.

  • 52 Badawi and Abdel Haleem, Dictionary of Qurʾanic Usage, p. 26, 97, 533, 617, 673, 867, 891.

25Moreover, while the above meanings give the reader some basic clues about the meanings of quwwa in the Qurʾān, there are two other clues which are equally important. In its attempt to direct its readers to discern the quwwa-related meanings comprehensively, the Qurʾān also urges them to look into, first, quwwa-related terms such as ġalīẓ/ġilẓa (harsh/harshness) (9: 123; 31: 24). Matīn (powerful) (7: 183), and al-Matīn (the Mighty/the Omnipotent) (58: 51). Ṣald (smooth solid rock) (2: 264). Makīn (secure/well established) (12: 54; 23: 13). Šawka (thorn/power) (8: 7). ʿIzzah (power/glory) (4: 139; 26: 44). Yad (pl. aydī) (power/control) (51: 47; 2: 237). Azr (power, capability) (20: 31). Baṭš (assault/fierce attack) (28: 19; 44: 16).52

  • 53 Ibid., p. 551-553.

26Second, the Qurʾān also urges its readers to understand the meanings of quwwa by looking into its opposite form, ḍaʿ f (weakness) which, along with its various derivatives, has been mentioned fifty two times in sixteen forms in the Qurʾān. The various derivatives convey various meanings such as becoming weak (3: 146); being insignificant (22: 73); to increase several times (2: 245); weakness (30: 54); under age (2: 266); and the weak and oppressed (4: 97).53 The Qurʾān, thus, contains a plethora of expressions involving quwwa and its antonym, ḍaʿ f.

  • 54 Knysh, Power and Impotence, p. 210-213.

27Classical and modern Egyptian exegetes did not pay due attention to trace the main terminologies of the verse, including the first theme discussed here, at least on lexical and contextual levels in the entire Qurʾān. They might not have deemed it necessary to focus on this issue due to their other different exegetical interests. While the attempt of Knysh, who tried to make a general overview of quwwa in the Qurʾān by referring to most of the classical and contemporary Egyptian exegetes, is plausible, he did not refer to Arab lexicographers or specialised Qurʾānic dictionaries from classical or modern times.54 Realistically, this adds to the atmosphere of uncertainty resulting from exclusivist understanding of these Qurʾānic terminologies which are sometimes misquoted, abused, and misinterpreted by some Muslims and non-Muslims, as stated earlier.

28Moreover, none of the above literal survey of the meanings of quwwa or its related terms instructs Muslims to use it to subdue people of other religions because they are non-Muslims. In a bid to clear much of the controversy around the meanings of quwwa and ribāṭ al-ḫayl, it is, therefore, imperative to examine their meanings according to the selected exegetes.

Classical Exegetes’ View of Quwwa and Ribāṭ al-Ḫayl

  • 55 Ribāṭ, which is originally derived from the root r.b.ṭ (tie or to bind), literally refers to the pl (...)
  • 56 Abū Dawūd, Sunan Abū Dawūd, no. 2514, in Mawsūʿat al- ḥadīth al-šarīf: al-kutub al-sitta, p. 1409.
  • 57 Al-abarī, Ǧāmiʿ al-bayān, vol. 10, p. 30-32.
  • 58 Al-Rāzī, Mafātīḥ al-ġayb, vol. 15, p. 148.
  • 59 See, for example, Maǧmaʿ al-Luġa al-ʿArabiyya, al-Muʿǧam al-waǧīz, p. 217; ayf et al. al-Muʿǧam al (...)

29Classical exegetes have offered a number of interpretations for both quwwa and ribāṭ al-ḫayl.55 Al-abarī gives several interpretations for the two interrelated terms stating that quwwa refers to all effective tools used in war such as swords, spears, bayonets, and, importantly, archery. To highlight this latter meaning, he quotes the following ḥadīṯ to support of his view: on the authority of ʿUqba ibn ʿAmir al-Ǧuhanī, who said: “I heard the Prophet saying while standing on the pulpit: ‘Prepare whatever quwwa you [believers] can muster’, and then he said, ‘Quwwa is but archery, quwwa is but archery, quwwa is but archery’.”56 Al-abarī also states that the polytheists are the targeted audience of such quwwa.57 The next chronological commentator, al-Rāzī, states that quwwa in the verse is general. It includes various types of weapons, fortresses, and horsemanship. Like al-abarī, he echoed the ‘archery interpretation’, but, unlike him, explained ribāṭ al-ḫayl by mares. His argument is that female horses are preferred to male ones namely for breeding purposes especially when they are tied at the Muslim frontiers. Al-Rāzī also states that learning how to shoot arrows, use weapons, and ride horses is farḍ kifāya (communal obligation).58 Indeed, this “sexiest” interpretation by al-Rāzī is not as sound as it may seem. This is because, first, what matters is the effective kind of the animal regardless of its sex. Second, al-Rāzī’s view here lacks lexical support, because a reference to the meaning of the Arabic word ḫayl (horses) in Arabic lexicons proves otherwise.59 Unlike al-abarī, al-Rāzī paid attention to the importance of deducing juristic rulings from the verse stating that preparing quwwa is a farḍ kifāya. This constitutes a breakthrough in the interpretation of the main theme of the verse under discussion.

  • 60 Al-Qurubī, al-Ǧāmiʿ, vol. 8, p. 35-37.

30Contrary to al-Rāzī’s view about preference for mares over male horses, al-Qurubī states that there is no difference between the two, as what matters is the most useful of the two at the Muslim frontiers. He, like his traditional predecessors, gave priority to the “archery interpretation”. What is so distinctive in his interpretation, however, is that he referred to the importance of establishing endowments (awqāf) to support Muslim soldiers to be better able to defend the umma. The same should be the case with horses, which are no less important, in his view, in protecting the Muslim frontiers.60 While this latter view is consistent with al-Qurubī’s care of deducing juristic rulings, as a leading Mālikī jurist, it is hard to trace this pioneering view in any of the other consulted classical and modern commentaries.

  • 61 Al-Alūsī, Rūḥ al-maʿ ā, vol. 10, p. 24.

31Stressing that quwwa and ribāṭ al-ḫayl refer to fighting all unbelievers, unlike al-Rāzī who limited its use to polytheists only, al-Alūsī points out the importance of preparing quwwa in anticipation of any surprising attacks. Unlike what happened in Badr in which Muslims achieved a victory for which they were not logistically prepared, Muammad and his companions, according to al-Alūsī’s commentary, have to prepare for victory by taking all possible means leading to it. Like his classical predecessors, he preferred the “archery interpretation” and, unlike al-Rāzī, he prefers male horses to mares as an interpretation of ribāṭ al-ḫayl, without justifying his view.61

32An in-depth look into the classical exegeses of quwwa and ribāṭ al-ḫayl above reveals that the “archery interpretation” had been extremely dominant until the beginning of the 19th century; a normal reflection of the loyalty of classical exegetes to tradition and literal interpretation of the Qurʾān. Such overwhelming military-oriented interpretation is, perhaps, one of the reasons why some extremist Muslims and non-Muslims have misunderstood the verse in question, especially when they appeal to classical interpretive sources. Importantly such classical sources, as can be deduced from their commentaries above, remained loyal to the “military interpretation”, but in no way did they call for offensive attacks against non-believers or polytheists, at least in their interpretations of the verse under discussion. In short, the classical understanding of quwwa, while highlighting the “military interpretation”, remained loyal to non-aggression against non-Muslims unless Muslims are attacked. This is, however, is absent from the literature of the members of the IG before declaring repentance. It is also the same vivid image in the controversial Fitna film, which is marked—as far the verse under discussion is concerned—by generalisation and the lack of attempting to track the interpretation of Qurʾānic texts from reliable sources.

33Undeniably, the dominant military-oriented interpretation made the classical exegetes overlook other social, economic and scientific aspects of life where quwwa is also much needed by Muslims of their time. Have the modern exegetes and scholars imitated their predecessors? This is what the following discussion will attempt to answer.

Modern Egyptian Exegetes’ View of Quwwa and Ribāṭ al-Ḫayl

  • 62 Riā, Tafsīr al-qurʾān al-ḥakīm, vol. 10, p. 69.

34The first chronological Egyptian commentator is Riā, who in his commentary, associates the preparation of quwwa with war, stating that such preparation can be achieved in two ways: first, by preparing all means that lead to quwwa to the best of Muslims’ ability; second, by equipping Muslim soldiers to be ready to defend the umma in case of attack. Nevertheless, Riā maintains that the word quwwa in the verse is general, and so it is obligatory upon Muslims to spare no efforts in manufacturing various weapons such as tanks, warships and warplanes. The mastery and excellence in developing the range of military industries is, according to him, farḍ kifāya upon Muslims.62

  • 63 Ibid., vol. 7, p. 499. See also al-Daġāmīn, Manhaǧiyyat al-bahṯ fī al-tafsīr al-mawḍūʿī, p. 20.

35While al-Manār’s commentary is famously known as a reformist modern interpretation viewing the reformist role of its authors, it remained tied by classical interpretation for two reasons. First, the dominance of the classical “archery interpretation”. Second, the repetition of al-Rāzī’s deduced ruling considering quwwa as farḍ kifāya, as stated above. While the author(s) of al-Manār clearly stated that, part of their contribution in their commentary is to critique classical exegetical interpretation.63 Such contribution is hard to find here with the visibly dominant classical “archery interpretation”. Al-Manār was serially published between the late eighteenth until the early 19th century when many Muslim countries were under occupation. The dominance of “military-oriented” interpretation is, therefore, a normal reflection of the exegetes’ surrounding circumstances even though being that strongly tied by its shackles is a reduction of the meanings of quwwa in the verse.

36The second chronological Egyptian commentator is Qub who is one of the foremost modern exegetes who discussed the issue of quwwa in the verse in detail. In his commentary he states that:

  • 64 Qub, ilāl, vol. 3, p. 1543; idem, In the Shade, vol. 7, p. 185, p. 1588 f.

“The first purpose that this quwwa serves is to establish peace and security for those who choose to accept Islam so they do not suffer any persecution as a result of this choice. Second, it deters the enemies of Islam from contemplating any form of aggression against the land of Islam. Third, such enemies would be sufficiently intimidated that they would not ever entertain any thought of trying to check the tide of Islam as it fulfils its mission of liberation. Finally, this quwwa is to be used to break any force that claims the attributes of the Almighty Allah and enforces its laws and legislation on human beings and refuses to accept that all sovereignty belongs to the Creator alone.”64

  • 65 Literally, ḥākimiyya (legal and governmental authority, sovereignty) is a verbal noun derived from (...)

37The four purposes of quwwa referred to above show the range of meanings Qub perceives in quwwa. According to him, it is a comprehensive and all-embracing concept; a view that is neither shared by other modern Egyptian exegetes nor by classical ones. Quwwa, according to him, has both constructive and destructive aspects. The first and the second purposes above indicate that quwwa has an apparently positive and constructive nature. Its aim is to establish peace and security to save Muslims from persecution at the hands of their enemies. According to the third and fourth purposes, however, it is perceived as something negative and destructive because its aim, in Qub’s understanding, is to intimidate those who may think of stemming the tide of Islamic liberation. In this case, quwwa is to be used to break those who refuse to surrender to the Sovereignty of Allāh (Ḥākimiyyat Allāh),65 a controversial concept widely discussed in some of Qub’s writings. Importantly, Qub also perceives quwwa as something limitless, which Muslims are ordered to secure to the best of their ability.

  • 66 Qub, ilāl, vol. 3, p. 1544; In the Shade, vol. 7, p. 186.
  • 67 Bin Jani, Sayyid Qutb’s View of Jihad, p. 362.
  • 68 Ibid.

38Qub also refers to the importance of acquiring resources as a conditional element in attaining quwwa, stressing that the quwwa Muslims are ordered to establish should strike fear and disseminate terror in the hearts of the enemies of Allāh. According to him, there are two kinds of enemies: those who are open and hostile and therefore known to the entire Muslim community, and others who hide their animosity and hostility towards Islam.66 In addition to embracing such constructive and destructive forms of quwwa, it can be inferred that Qub strongly propounds the offensive use of force; an attitude for which he has been severely criticized. Such criticism has been pointed out by Mohd Shah Bin Jani, a contemporary researcher who wrote his PhD on Qub’s view of jihad. Bin Jani states that the source of criticism of Qub lies with liberal critics and Western observers, who tend to find a direct link between Qub’s understanding of jihad and the widespread violence and political turbulence that significantly characterized so-called ‘Islamic’ radicalism in Middle Eastern politics throughout the 1970s and early 1980s.67 Although Bin Jani sees that the influence of Qub on many extremist or radical groups in Egypt and in other Arab countries has apparently been exaggerated, there are elements of truth in the analysis of these liberal and Western critics.68

  • 69 According to Omar Ashour, the origins of Jihadism go back to Egypt in the late 1960s and 1970s. Th (...)
  • 70 Amad, al-Nabī al-musallaḥ (1): al-Rāfiḍūn, vol. 1, p. 57, 117, 123, 129, 132, 141, 169; idem, al- (...)

39Undoubtedly, these extremist views of Qub, in which quwwa shifts from being mere military preparedness for deterrent purposes to being an offensive tool whose purpose is to subdue others, have had their impact on shaping the understanding, and hence the attitude of some of the extremist groups, such as some of the IG members in their pre-repentance stage in Egypt, al-Qaeda and its affiliated groups internationally, and controversial figures like Wilders. Therefore, it is no wonder that Qub is regarded as the ideologue and the godfather of modern extremism.69 His Signposts is considered the manifesto of modern radicalism. However, this view can easily be challenged if one undertakes a meticulous reading of the literature attributed to the IG in the 1970s and early 1980s. In this literature, it is easy to identify the huge influence of the same medieval thinker whose views influenced Qub; that is Ibn Taymiyya.70

  • 71 Indeed, the views of Qub have had their influence not only on Egypt but also on other countries su (...)
  • 72 Sometimes translated ‘The Hidden Imperative’ although the translation cited in the body of the text (...)
  • 73 For limitation purposes, the literature of the Islamic Group in Egypt with reference to the Neglect (...)
  • 74 In the remaining part of this paper, the Neglected Duty or al-Farīḍa al-Ġāʾiba will be referred to (...)
  • 75 According to Kelsay, the translated title, which suggests the omission or absence of jihad, is a re (...)
  • 76 Jansen, The Neglected Duty, p. 1 f.; idem, “The Creed of Sadat’s Assassins: The Contents of ‘The Fo (...)
  • 77 Jansen, The Neglected Duty, p. 159-230.

40An analysis of the extremist discourse in Egypt shows that the interpretation of quwwa, according to Qub, has been gaining currency from the second half of the 20th century up to the present times.71 A very clear example is al-Farīḍa al- ġāʾiba (The Neglected Duty),72 an important pamphlet of the IG in Egypt73 written by Muammad ʿAbd al-Salām Faraǧ (1954-1982). The ‘neglected duty’74 refers to the duty of ǧihād,75 and its author was executed on 15 April 1982 along with the four assassins of former Egyptian president, Anwar Sādāt (1918-1981).76 Jansen, who translated all of the Farīḍa77, is apparently the only Western scholar who has made an excellent presentation and analysis of this important document. In his discussion of the Farīḍa, Jansen highlights the refutations of the pioneering Egyptian scholars of the time, such as the Grand Sheikh of al-Azhar Ǧād al-aqq ʿAlī Ǧād al-aqq (1917-1996) and the contemporary Egyptian thinker Muammad ʿImāra (b. 1931-…), as well as al-Šaʿrāwī, our third modern chronological exegete. Before presenting the main refutations of the scholars who criticized the Farīḍa, it is important to refer to the controversial views disseminated in this document with special reference to Muslim/non-Muslim relations. It is important, however, to have a general overview of the Farīḍa before attempting to highlight this specific point.

41The Farīḍa asserts that:

  • 78 Ibid., p. 167.

“The State (of Egypt in which we live today) is ruled by the Laws of Unbelief although the majority of its inhabitants are Muslims.”78

42As for the rulers of Muslims, the author of the Farīḍa declares that they:

  • 79 Ibid., p. 169.

“…are in apostasy from Islam. They were raised at the tables of imperialism, be it Crusaderism, or Communism, or Zionism. They carry nothing from Islam but their names, even though they pray and fast and claim (iddiʿāʾ ) to be Muslim.”79

  • 80 Jansen, The Creed of Sadat’s Assassins, p. 30; Scott, An ‘Official’ Islamic Response, p. 39.
  • 81 ʿImāra, al-Farīḍa al-ġāʾiba: ʿarḍ wa ḥiwār wa taqyīm, p. 9; Jansen, The Neglected Duty, p. 166.
  • 82 A town located in southeastern Turkey.
  • 83 Yasa is a mixture of the beliefs adopted by Genghis Khan, Judaism, Christianity and Islam. ʿImāra, (...)
  • 84 ʿImāra, al-Farīḍa al-ġāʾiba, p. 9; ʿAbd al-āliq, al-Manẓūr al-dīnī wa-l-qānūnī li-ǧarāʾim al-irhāb(...)
  • 85 ʿImāra, al-Farīḍa al-ġāʾiba, p. 9 f.

43It is clear from these two quotations that the members of the IG at that time did not consider their fellow Muslim Egyptians as apostates although they did not hesitate to say that the ruler (i.e. Sādāt) was ipso facto an apostate who should be killed.80 Based on this extremist understanding, the author of the Farīḍa poses this challenging question: ‘Do we live in an Islamic state?’81 To answer this question, he cites long quotations from the response of Ibn Taymiyya who was asked about whether the people of Mardin82 were living in a territory of peace or a territory of war. The inhabitants of Mardin continued to follow the Yasa83 code of laws of Genghis Khan (1127-1167) instead of the Islamic law, even though they adopted Islam.84 Ibn Taymiyya declared that the people of Mardin were to be treated according to their beliefs: the Muslim in this town should be treated according to what was due to him, whereas the one who rebelled against the laws of Islam should be treated according to what was due to him.85

  • 86 “The New Mardin Declaration”, <http://www.kalamresearch.com/publications/23-the-mardin-conference.html > accessed on 20 May 2013.

44Ibn Taymiyya’s answer cannot, in my view, be justifiably transferred to a completely different context, as the author of the Farīḍa has done. Was Egypt at the time Faraǧ authored his book the same as Mardin? The answer is emphatically ‘no’. Interestingly, Ibn Taymiyya’s opinion on Mardin was recently highlighted at an international peace summit on the topic ‘Mardin: The Abode of Peace’ convened at Artuklu University in the Turkish city of Mardin on 27-28 March 2010 to discuss the classification of the city of Mardin during Ibn Taymiyya’s lifetime.86 The scholars attending came from countries as diverse as Bosnia, Iran, Morocco, Mauritania and Saudi Arabia, and concluded that:

  • 87 Ibid.; importantly, the recommendations of this timely peace summit were reflected in major Western (...)

“Ibn Taymiyya’s fatwa concerning Mardin can under no circumstances be appropriated and used as evidence for levelling the charge of kufr (unbelief) against fellow Muslims, rebelling against rulers, deeming game their lives and property, terrorizing those who enjoy safety and security, acting treacherously towards those who live (in harmony) with fellow Muslims or with whom fellow Muslims live (in harmony) via the bond of citizenship and peace… Anyone who seeks support from this fatwa for killing Muslims or non-Muslims has erred in his interpretation and has misapplied the revealed texts.”87

  • 88 ʿImāra, al-Farīḍa al-ġāʾiba, p. 33 f.
  • 89 Ibid., p. 47.

45Moreover, ʿImāra challenges Faraǧ’s radical and unsubstantiated claim, doubting whether he had actually read the Yasa before expressing his view. He also adds that there is no evidence in the Farīḍa to support this claim. Thus, ʿImāra continues, Faraǧ’s view cannot be accepted88 because claiming that the rulers of today are the same as those of the Tatars, and even more wicked than they, and therefore deserve to be killed, is a false analogical deduction.89

  • 90 Jansen, The Neglected Duty, p. 168, 170, 172, 174, 175, 176, 177, 179, 180, 181, 192, 207, 215, 216 (...)
  • 91 ʿImāra, al-Farīḍa al-ġāʾiba, p. 9.
  • 92 For one of the very few references to Qub in the Farīḍa; Jansen, The Neglected Duty, p. 226.
  • 93 Al-ʿAwwā, al-Ǧamāʿa al-islāmiyya, p. 24.

46The insistence on quoting Ibn Taymiyya’s views regarding this particular issue, as well as in various other parts of the pamphlet,90 reveals that Faraǧ and his like depend heavily on persons rather than texts in formulating their views, which is evidence of their inability to deduce rulings from original sources. This is the same approach embraced by Wilders in his Fitna film. ʿImāra consequently claims that Ibn Taymiyya is the Group’s first ideologue.91 ʿImāra’s claim here is actually substantiated by solid evidence, but this is not to downplay the influence of Qub on this extremist group because, while Qub’s name is hardly mentioned92 in the treatise, his radical views can easily be read between the lines. Qub was undoubtedly a member of the Muslim Brotherhood before his death and, towards the beginning of the 1970s, his group had, according to S. al-ʿAwwā, completely stopped adopting violence, and started a process of al-iṣlāḥ al-tadrīǧī (gradual reform).93 This may be a reason behind Faraǧ’s vivid presentation of IbnTaymiyya, who is a more classical authority than Qub, who belonged to an ideologically different group at that time, although his views carry an impact that remains hard to conceal.

  • 94 Taḥrīr al-Quds (liberating Jerusalem) is mentioned in the Farīḍa. ʿImāra, al-Farīḍa al-ġāʾiba, p. 2 (...)
  • 95 Ibid., p. 23 f.
  • 96 Faraǧ was an electrician with only shallow theological knowledge. Kepel, The Roots of Radical, p. 1 (...)

47Moreover, Faraǧ sets a demarcation line between two types of enemies: al-ʿAduww al-qarīb (the near enemy) and al-ʿAduww al-baʿ īd (the far enemy). It is evident from his argument that the near enemies are the apostate rulers and the far enemies are those who occupy Muslim lands such as al-Quds (Jerusalem).94 Although defending and freeing occupied Muslim territories is a legal obligation, Faraǧ attempts to prioritize these options, giving fighting ‘apostate’ rulers priority over fighting occupying forces. Critiquing this view, ʿImāra adds that achieving victory over the far enemy, in Faraǧ’s understanding, entails a tacit approval of Muslim regimes he regards as un-Islamic, as fighting a non-Muslim enemy requires Muslim leadership.95 It is even more interesting that military jihad comes second, after fighting and eradicating the ‘apostate rulers’ and that this extremist understanding of the medieval legacy and its selectivity in using the textual sources was rejected by scholars who were Faraǧ’s contemporaries. Unlike him,96 they were well-versed in Islamic scholarship, a sufficient reason why their views regarding this issue are well received.

  • 97 Jansen, The Neglected Duty, p. 144.
  • 98 Ibid., p. 144 f.
  • 99 S. al-ʿAwwā attributes the failure of al-Šaʿrāwī’s initiative to the refusal of some members of the (...)

48Al-Šaʿrāwī’s response to Faraǧ and his group mainly took the form of a newspaper reply to an interview on these issues in the Egyptian daily al-Ahrām on 8, 16 and 18 November 1981.97 Unlike ʿImāra, who dedicated a whole book to critiquing the extremist ideology of the Farīḍa, al-Šaʿrāwī’s criticism is more simply that he is ‘ḍiddahum’ (against them) and ‘…the murderer and his accomplices are not anṣār al-Islām (the Helpers of Islam)”’.98 It may be because of the nature of replying to newspaper interviews, when a scholar finds it difficult to critique views without consulting reliable sources and checking the reliability of the evidence, that al-Šaʿrāwī’s response may seem reactionary. In addition, it is hard to find any direct or indirect reference to Faraǧ’s pamphlet in al-Šaʿrāwī’s interpretation, although it has been observed that he proposed an initiative to the Egyptian Ministry of Interior at that time, which, however, was doomed to failure, according to S. al-ʿAwwā.99 Moreover, in his commentary, al-Šaʿrāwī highlights the necessity of acquiring and possessing quwwa, stating that the use of force is limited to an imminent war situation. Muslims, in al-Šaʿrāwī’s understanding, are in no way allowed to turn their possession of quwwa into a destructive tool to harming civilians beyond a situation where hostilities are launched on a defensive basis.

49Al-Šaʿrāwī may have preferred to leave the issue of dialoguing with extremists to be handled officially, particularly by official Azharī scholars, especially Ǧād al-aqq ʿAlī Ǧād al-aqq, the then Grand Sheikh of al-Azhar and ʿAiyya aqr (1914-2006), the then head of the al-Azhar Fatwa Committee. It is also possible that al-Šaʿrāwī did not want to burden his TV audience with such issues or he felt that sharing them with ordinary people would aggravate the problem.

  • 100 Ǧād al-aqq and aqr, “Naqḍ al-farīḍa al-ġāʾiba”, p. 7; Scott, An ‘Official’ Islamic Response, p. 5 (...)

50Both Ǧād al-aqq and aqr provide a scholarly analysis and criticism of the Farīḍa. They state in their co-authored book, published as an attachment to the al-Azhar magazine in 1993, that they prepared their naqḍ (refutation) of the Farīḍa after being given a photocopy of the 54-page original pamphlet.100

  • 101 Kelsay, Arguing the Just War, p. 133.
  • 102 This, in Omar Ashour’s understanding, does not mean that the members of the Group at that time were (...)
  • 103 Also referred to in Arabic as mubādarat waqf al-ʿunf (initiative to halt violence).
  • 104 Sometimes referred to in modern Western literature as ‘ideological reorientation’. This process is (...)
  • 105 Al-ʿAwwā, al-Ǧamāʿa al-islāmiyya, p. 46; Lacroix, “Ayman al-Zawahiri, Veteran of Jihad”, p. 159; Pe (...)

51While Kelsay’s reference to the Farīḍa puts much emphasis on the Sheikh of al-Azhar, by virtue of the latter being considered the most authoritative Islamic figure in Egypt and, supposedly, the world of Sunni Islam,101 the efforts of other non-official scholars, such as ʿImāra and al-Šaʿrāwī, cannot be ignored. Thus, the refutations of ʿImāra, Ǧād al-aqq, aqr and al-Šaʿrāwī’s failed initiative constitute the main efforts made to refute the extremist ideology of Faraǧ and his colleagues. Because of the limited nature of this paper, it is impossible to present these scholarly refutations, but it is interesting to highlight the efforts of Faraǧ’s former colleagues, who ultimately renounced their old extremist interpretations. Those who once refused even to meet scholars such as al-Šaʿrāwī102 and have misquoted many Qurʾanic verses, including the verse under discussion, only a few years ago started publishing their courageous initiative known as al-muraǧaʿāt103 (ideological revisions)104 in which the leaders of the Group revoked their original violent stance by publishing self-critical reviews. This started on 5 July 1997 from their cells inside Egyptian prisons.105

  • 106 It is not only the refutation literature that is hard to find, but also the historical background o (...)
  • 107 Al-Šarīf and āfi, al-Nuṣḥ wa-l-tabyīn taṣḥīḥ mafāhīm al-muḥtasibīn; Zuhdī, Tafǧīrāt al-Riyāḍ: (...)
  • 108 The web address of the bilingual website of the Egyptian Islamic Group is: <http://www.egyig.com>; accessed on 26 May 201</http>
  • 109 “Liqāʿāt”, <http://www.egyig.com/Public/articles/interview/7/26176518.shtml; accessed on 28 May 201 (...)
  • 110 “Abnāʾ al-Ǧamāʿa al-islāmiyya. Al-Amn qabila tawbatahum wa-l-muǧtamaʿ rafaahum”, http://www.islamo (...)
  • 111 In Zidane’s recently published study, he refers to the fact that the Group members have distanced t (...)

52While the refutations of the Egyptian scholars received wide coverage in Western academic discourse, especially by academics such as Jansen, it is hard to find in-depth coverage of the recent literature published by the leaders of the IG in Egypt in current Western scholarship.106 Various justifications can be found for this. First, the Group’s literature in which they published most of al-Muraǧaʿāt is still in Arabic107 and, as far as I have been able to determine, not a single book has so far been published in any other language. This gives an indication that the Group is seemingly talking to itself, or, let us say to the wider Egyptian community. Although the English version of their website gives the outside reader some idea of al-murāǧaʿāt, this is still limited to translating articles published in Arabic on the group’s bilingual website.108 Indeed, this lack of accessibility to the ideological revisions ascertains the wrong perception and misunderstanding not only about this important revisionist step of the IG’s ideology, but also its misunderstanding and misinterpreting of Qurʾanic verses, among which is the Q 8: 60. Second, from the mid 1990s until the Egyptian Revolution in early 2011, the activities of the Group have taken place under strict surveillance by Egyptian State Security. The members of the Group can hardly air their new tolerant views in public,109 and are treated as social outcasts among their local communities.110 It is thus extremely difficult for them to remove the perceptions created by years of accumulated violence locally, let alone internationally especially when they are still considered, at least by the public, as being emotionally attached to terrorist groups such as al-Qaeda and its leaders. Third, some Western scholars are unaware of the availability of some of the Group’s published literature (i.e. al-murāǧaʿāt), and others lack objectivity and put all modern extremist groups, including the repenting members of the Group, in one basket, paying little or no attention to al-murāǧaʿāt as a historical turning point. Wilders is a typical example of this latter group of some Western intellectuals. This constitutes an obstacle in formulating an objective and updated worldview of the Group. For these three reasons, I think, al-murāǧaʿāt remains almost unheard of in modern Western writings,111 which usually link Qub to al-Qaeda while pretending to have forgotten the historical attempts of al-murāǧaʿāt made by the leaders of the IG in Egypt.

  • 112 Ibrāhīm, al-ākimiyya, p. 103.
  • 113 Ibid., p. 189-211.
  • 114 Zuhdī, Tafǧīrāt al-Riyāḍ, p. 40-42.

53While the murāǧaʿāt literature started to see the light of day in the late 1990s and early 2000s, obtaining it from the publishing houses was a challenging task before the Egyptian Revolution in 2011. An in-depth look into the murāǧaʿāt literature reveals that most, if not all, of the fateful jihad thesis earlier championed by Faraǧ and Dr Fal has been irrevocably discarded by the current leaders of the Group, including Dr Fal himself. Emphasis is placed on the Qurʾanic verses that incline to peace and forgiveness rather than war and fighting,112 asserting that Ibn Taymiyya’s opinion regarding the people of Mardin and the Yasa, once suitable for a certain time and place, cannot be imported to the Egyptian case. Thus, the qiyās (deduction by analogy) is not acceptable between the two cases.113 Musālama (peaceful co-existence), taḥāluf (coalition), taʿāwun (co-operation) and muṣālaḥa (reconciliation) are all terms that occur widely in the Group’s literature, which presents messages such as: “…Islam does not consider military confrontation the only available option that has to be followed”, “…the purpose of fighting in Islam is to remove fitna” (persecution) “…not just to exercise fighting for the sake of fighting”. The September 11th 2001 attacks, the Bali attacks in Indonesia, and the Riyadh attacks are all rejected as abominable acts representing a total distortion of jihad.114

  • 115 Ibrāhīm, Taṭbīq al-aḥkām min iḫtiṣāṣ al-ḥukkām, p. 73.
  • 116 Al-Šarīf and āfi, al-Nuṣḥ wa-l-tabyīn, p. 85.
  • 117 Muammad, Ḥurmat al-ġulūw fī al-dīn, p. 100-114. Al-Qaraāwī himself has stated that, although at c (...)

54In addition, clear messages have been presented in other books published by prominent leaders of the Group, messages that call for carefully studying the reality before issuing any legal judgment, give priority to the voice of reason over that of enthusiasm,115 and prefer pluralistic views to dichotomous divisions.116 Quotations from Ibn Taymiyya, in addition to being seen as unsuitable, are now replaced by modern statements by scholars such as al-Qaraāwī.117

  • 118 Al-Qaraāwī, Fiqh al-ǧihād: dirāsa muqārana, vol. 2, p. 1168 f; idem, al-Islām wa-l-ʿunf, p. 40-58.

55The existence of the extremist and selective interpretations of the Qurʾān made by the leaders of the Group in the 1970s and 1980s, including those of the Q 8: 60, despite the courageous step in the late 1990s in which the earlier views were rejected, may remain a stumbling block to the favourable reception of the new peaceful ideology of the Group in the public sphere. Another reason for the lack of such favourable reception is the lack of efforts on the part of the modern scholars of al-Azhar in critiquing al-Murāǧaʿāt. Many contemporary al-Azhar scholars, especially those affiliated to the official institution whose predecessors led various initiatives to refute the Farīḍa, give little or no attention to al-Murāǧaʿāt; let alone do they write academically to refute extremist views of al-Qaeda and its abuse of various Qurʾanic verses in general, and the Q 8: 60 in particular. Concerted efforts are made, however, by scholars who received their education at al-Azhar, but such scholars remain independent in expressing their views. Al-Qaraāwī is a very clear example of a scholar who hailed the Murāǧaʿāt initiative,118 although his analysis is far from the deeper methodological approach applied earlier by the scholars who critiqued the Farīḍa.

  • 119 Brooke, “Jihadist Strategic Debates”, p. 207 f.
  • 120 Al-Qaraāwī, al-Islām wa-l-ʿ unf, p. 54; Migaux, “The Roots of Islamic Radicalism”, p. 291.
  • 121 For a confirmation of the radical views of ʿAbd al-Ramān, see for example, ʿAbd al-Ramān, “Mawqif (...)

56It is also said that ʿUmar ʿAbd al-Ramān (1938-…), an al-Azhar scholar who has been considered the spiritual guide of the Group from the 1970s until the present,119 has disowned his radical views.120 This is uncertain, however, because he is under strict imprisonment in the US, and has not, up to the time of writing of this paper, published any refutation of his earlier bloody-thirsty fatwas (legal rulings) or relinquished his hard-line views as an al-Azhar academic who earned his PhD from that institution.121 All in all, al-Murāǧaʿāt remains a courageous step in the right direction and is to be considered a landmark in the history of an extremist group that first condoned terrorism but later abhors it.

  • 122 Ashour, The De-Radicalization of Jihadists, p. 2, 56.

57Nevertheless, it must be admitted that not all members of the Group have rejected violence. Some, notably al-awāhirī especially after the death of Bin Laden (1957- 2011), continue to call for “military ǧihād”, but this time with a special focus on the far enemy. Omar Ashour states that, “That process [al-Murāǧaʿāt], has been only partially successful however, as three factions within al-jihad still refuse to uphold it. These factions also refuse to leave the Organization and one of them is in alliance with al-Qaʿida. The process is thus still ongoing at the present time”.122

  • 123 Kepel, The Roots of Radical, p. 12. See also idem, The War for Muslim Minds: Islam and the West, p. (...)
  • 124 Chertoff, “The Ideology of Terrorism”, p. 14.

58Moreover, Kepel argues that it is because the terrorists’ battle against the near enemy has failed, that they must once again consider the far enemy as the primary target. With such extremist views, al-awāhirī and other key leaders of al-Qaʿida consider the US as the main representative of this far enemy.123 More seriously stated, al-Qaʿida leaders consider anyone who does not embrace their ideology, including hundreds of millions of Muslims, as legitimate military targets.124

59It can be inferred from the above discussion that the role of the Muslim state is marginalized by the classical and modern exegetes. It is only the individual’s role that is stressed. In their commentaries, the modern exegetes limited their interpretations of quwwa and ribāṭ al-ḫayl to overwhelmingly military-oriented interpretation, and many of them might have overlooked other non-military domains of quwwa. Have modern Muslim scholars attempted to fill this lacuna by providing alternative interpretation to the dominating classical and modern military one?

  • 125 See, for example, Nūr, al-Qitāl fī al-Iislām p. 23-125; Al-Qaraāwī, Fiqh al-ǧihād: dirāsa muqārana(...)

60Modern scholars agree that quwwa in the verse is not literally limited to the physical aspect of military quwwa alone. Rather, it extends to encompass economic, educational, technical, administrative, moral, intellectual, psychological, financial and medical quwwa. It differs from one time to another and from one place to another.125

  • 126 Nūr, al-Qitāl, p. 23-125; al-Qāsimī, al-Ǧihād wa-l-uqūq al-dawliyya al-ʿāmma fī al-islām, p. 246.
  • 127 Nūr, al-Qitāl, p. 26.
  • 128 Ibid.
  • 129 Ibid., p. 97.

61Of the many modern scholars who have discussed the concept of the preparation of quwwa in Qurʾān 8: 60 in great detail is Amad Nūr. He widely discusses various concepts of the preparation of quwwa.126 In Nūr’s view, the preparation of quwwa includes five main categories:127 theoretical preparation, material preparation, managerial preparation, technical preparation, and financial preparation. Nūr goes on to mention the sub-categories of each kind and their importance. He, for example, divides theoretical preparation into two main sub-categories: scientific, which includes ideas, principles and ideology; and moral, which includes the behaviour to be followed by both leaders and soldiers.128 He also states that material preparation includes three sub-categories: preparing individuals for the battlefield, preparing military supplies, and preparing the necessary ammunition.129

  • 130 Ibid., p. 126.
  • 131 Indeed, el-Awaisi’s article is a very clear example of that. See el-Awaisi, “The Conceptual Approac (...)

62Although Nūr gave a detailed interpretation of quwwa, it is overwhelmingly linked to military preparation; a reality difficult to conceal when he discusses technical preparation, for example.130 Laudably, Nūr has broadened the concept of the preparation of quwwa in an unprecedented way in terms of the categories and sub-categories he outlines in detail. However, the way he continually links the concept of the preparation of quwwa to achieving excellence in the battlefield limits his seemingly detailed concept of quwwa. It is also noteworthy that only Nūr’s detailed discussion about the preparation of quwwa seems to be highlighted in some of the modern English-written literature concerned with the issue.131

  • 132 Al-Qaraāwī, Fiqh al-ǧihād: dirāsa muqārana, vol. 1, p. 536.
  • 133 Ibid., vol. 1, p. 590.

63Moreover, it seems that Nūr is not the only scholar whose view about quwwa in the verse in question is limited to military preparedness. The renowned Muslim scholar Yūsuf al-Qaraāwī considers that preparing military quwwa is the most important aspect of preparation in the verse, although such quwwa, in his understanding, is not sufficient by itself. Nevertheless, being self-sufficient in acquiring it—as opposed to acquiring it from others—for possible future use on the battlefield may become inevitable for Muslims.132 Al-Qaraāwī also adds that the ḫayl of our modern age are tanks, armoured vehicles, warships, submarines, gunboats, rockets and air missiles, as well as other various forms of sophisticated weapons used on land, sea and air. To him ḫayl is just a tool in jihad that is subject to change according to time, place and circumstance. He further stresses that the human element is the real power and that any state-of-the art technology that is applied to war is useless unless accompanied by capable and well-trained soldiers.133

  • 134 Ibid., vol. 1, pp. 590 f.
  • 135 “Imtilāk al-umma li-l-aslia al-nawawiyya”; <http://www.onislam.net/arabic/ask-the-scholar/8363-/8332/52543-2004-08-01%2017-37-04.html>; accessed on 29 May, 2013.
  • 136 Delcambre, Inside Islam, p. 18.

64Referring to modern ways of possessing quwwa, al-Qaraāwī also draws a clear line between possessing and using weapons of mass destruction (WMD). According to him, the Muslim umma is obliged to possess these kinds of weapons. At the same time, he considers it strictly forbidden in Islam to use these weapons against others. He argues that Islam forbids killing non-combatants—women, children, the aged, farmers, and monks—let alone killing thousands or even millions at the same time by using WMD.134 This last view of al-Qaraāwī is supported by the al-Azhar House of Fatwa (AHF) in Egypt. The AHF states that manufacturing and possessing WMD is an obligation upon Muslims in order to deter the enemies of Islam, and defend Muslims provided that this does not lead to transgression against non-combatants. According to the AHF, it is also obligatory for Muslim countries to use any weapon deemed suitable to defend themselves if using such weapons is necessary for self-defence.135 This fatwa by al-Azhar has been condemned by some Western authors such as Anne-Marie Delcambre (1943-…), who claims that on the basis of this fatwa, “…the Islamic university of al-Azhar, in Egypt, preaches war”, so, “Why should we expect Al-Azhar to speak the same language of peace as Pope John-Paul II?”.136 Noticeably, Delcambre’s claim here is baseless because she selectively chooses to refer to that part of the fatwa which serves her interest, while ignoring the conditions laid by the fatwa which limit war to defensive purposes only. This selective approach can be erroneously applied to any other religious legal source, including, of course, the speeches and statements of the late Pope John-Paul II (1920-2005). Such attitudes should have no place in academic discussion, whose protagonists should maintain objectivity, something lacking in the view held by Delcambre. In addition, she mistakenly refers to the “the Islamic university of al-Azhar” as the source of the fatwa, which is not the place from where it was originally issued, although the AHF House of Fatwa is an institution affiliated to al-Azhar.

  • 137 “How Islam Views Possession of Nukes”, <https://www.onislam.net/english/ask-the-scholar/-international-relations-and-jihad/relations-during-peace/175739.html >; accessed on 29 May, 2013.
  • 138 Ibid..

65Moreover, some modern scholars, such as the famous American scholar Muzammil Siddiqi, have opposed the opinion of al-Qaraāwī and that of the AHF, declaring that Islam is against all forms of WMD.137 In his critique, Siddiqi does not distinguish between the possession and the use of WMD, but it is clear from the context that he is against both, especially towards the end of his fatwa, where he calls for a universal ban on testing, developing and possessing all weapons of mass destruction and nuclear weapons.138

  • 139 See Hallaq, “Was the Gate of Ijtihad Closed?”, p. 3 f.

66Thus, the differences between the views of some modern scholars regarding the possession and use of WMD by Muslim countries reflect opposing attitudes. All that has been written so far about this issue, according to my exhaustive research, does not amount to a detailed study. Therefore, it is necessary that individual and collective iǧtihād (exertion of intellectual reasoning in understanding laws)139 be applied in order to study this important topic in light of the Q 8: 60. Nevertheless, the researcher considers that the possession of WMD, as a form of quwwa by Muslim countries, may be a necessity in the contemporary age in order for Muslims to more successfully achieve the required deterrence that is clearly envisaged in the Q 8: 60.

  • 140 Al-ifnī, Mawsūʿat al-Qurʾān, p. 1880.

67All in all, none of the above modern scholars have referred to any negative aspect of using quwwa against non-Muslims while employing violent means that may lead to killing. On the contrary, their discussion in general applies to times of both war and peace.140 Even at times when military conflict between Muslims and non-Muslims becomes inevitable, preparation for the use of quwwa is still limited to an enemy who shows animosity or at least serious intention of attacking Muslims. Interesting, however, is the absence of any interpretations by modern scholars—as is the case with classical and modern exegetes too, except for Qub—which call for the ‘abuse’ of quwwa in a way that is harmful to others. This is what justifies the rejection of extremist interpretations held both by terrorist groups, who twist the context of the above verse, as well as by some non-Muslims, whose understanding of the verse proves to be selective, as indicated earlier in this paper. Thus, it can be said that quwwa and ribāṭ al-ḫayl in their modern sense should be understood as tools in a defensive war, which are, therefore, not allowed to be used as tools of disseminating fear and terror among non-Muslims who live in peace with Muslims. Rather, they are tools whose objective is to make the enemies of Muslims think twice before attacking Muslim frontiers.

Conclusion

68From the foregoing discussion, it would appear that the meaning of the text of the Qurʾān, like any other divine text, can be easily altered if studied without lending due importance to its original context. This may explain why this paper has attempted to present the views of some classical and modern Egyptian exegetes, as well as those of some modern scholars regarding the Q 8: 60. The context of the verse originally relates to the strong possibility of an outbreak of war between Muslims and non-Muslims. It calls for Muslims to be well prepared for possible or imminent military attacks against them.

69Quwwa and ribāṭ al-ḫayl, while being predominantly linked to ‘military interpretation’, as explained by the selected classical and modern Egyptian exegetes, should be understood as means that should serve Muslim causes at times of both war and peace. Quwwa, it emerges, should not literally be limited to the physical and military power. Rather, it should be understood as a comprehensive concept that encompasses other economic, educational, intellectual and even psychological domains.

70Moreover, the possible use of quwwa within the military domain should be directed against an enemy whose animosity is known to Muslims or is seriously planning to attack them. While classical exegetes, especially al-Rāzī and al-abarī, broadened the understanding of military quwwa to include various weapons, fortresses and horsemanship, their interpretations reveal that the use of quwwa is limited to self-defence. This is also the view expressed by all modern Egyptian exegetes with the exception of Qub.

71Qub’s extremist understanding of the use of quwwa in the verse has contributed to a huge degree of misunderstanding about verses discussing military confrontation within the Qurʾān in general, and particularly the Q 8: 60. This misunderstanding is exemplified by some extremist Muslim groups who embrace Qub’s views and attempt to apply them by giving themselves the authority to kill people of other faiths, lamentably, in the name of Islam. This also gives some non-Muslims, who already have biased attitudes towards Muslims, the justification to attack the Qurʾān as a fascist book preaching hatred and animosity, as has been carefully orchestrated by Wilders, whose ‘abuse’ of the verse under discussion cannot be denied.

72The ‘abuse’ of the verse is not limited to Wilders and other Western politicians, but also encompasses some Muslims who, while not apparently known for harbouring extremist views, still lack sound understanding, which increases the perplexity of the already perplexed mind of the reader.

73Most notably, direct reference to contemporary events especially in the interpretations of selected modern Egyptian exegetes is hard to find. While some of them, like al-Šaʿrāwī, were personally involved in brokering peace with the IG in Egypt, their interpretations lack any clear reference to this important issue. The interpretation of quwwa remained strongly attached to the ‘archery interpretation’ even in its modern sense. While some modern Egyptian exegetes witnessed the start of the age of information technology and some of them were frequent TV guests, none of them, unfortunately, referred to the necessity of launching moderate Muslim media outlets to propagate the message of Islam or at least refute some of the misconceptions against it, let alone facing extremist ideas upfront in such media outlets. Compared to the contribution of modern Egyptian exegetes, the interpretation of some modern scholars shows a tendency to the necessity of providing a day-to-day interpretation away from the predominant traditional interpretation of quwwa; a thing which this paper calls for.

74While the greatest majority of the modern Egyptian commentators and scholars, who belong to the prestigious al-Azhar institution, made a laudable effort toward combating extremist ideas and interpretations of their time, as earlier explained, their current successors are lacking, at least academically, in courageous initiatives to combat extremist groups such as al-Qaʿida internationally. There is hardly any current critical analysis of the modern revisionist attitude of some members of the IG in Egypt by al-Azhar as an institution. A few scattered, individual efforts have been exerted in this regard by scholars belonging to the institution, but a bigger role beyond brief media spots should be expected of an institution supposedly representing the world of Sunni Islam internationally.

Top of page

Bibliography

In Arabic

ʿAbd al-Bāqī, Muḥammad Fuʾād, al-Muʿǧam al-mufahras li alfāẓ al-Qurʾān al-karīm, Cairo, Dār al-Ḥadīṯ, 1988.

ʿAbd al-Ġanī, afwat, “Liqāʾāt”, [article online]; available from http://www.egyig.com-/Public/articles/interview/7/26176518.shtml; accessed 28 May 2013.

ʿAbd al-Ḫāliq, Muḥammad ʿAbd al-Munʿim, al-Manẓūr al-dīnī wa-l-qānūnī li-ǧarāʾim al-irhāb, Cairo, Dār al-Nahḍa al-ʿArabiyya, 1999.

ʿAbd al-Raḥmān, ʿUmar, “Mawqif al-Qurʾān min ḫuṣūmihi kamā tuṣawwiruhu sūrat al-Tawba”, Cairo, PhD thesis, Department of Qurʾān Interpretation, Faculty of Uṣūl al-Dīn, al-Azhar University, 1972.

Abu Dawūd, Sunan Abu Dawūd, in Mawsūʿat al-ḥadīt al-šarīf: al-kutub al-sitta, ed. Ṣāliḥ bin ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz Āl al-Šaykh, Riyaḍ, Dār al-salām li-l-Našr wa-l-Tawzīʿ, 1999.

al-ʿAdawī, Ibrāhim Aḥmad, Rašīd Riḍā: al-Imām al-mujāhid, Cairo, al-Muʾassasa al-Miṣriyya al-ʿĀmma li-l-Taʾlīf wa-l-Anbāʾ wa-l-Našr, n.d.

Amad, Rif ʿat Sayyid, al-Nabī al-musallaḥ (1): al-Rāfīḍūn, London, Riad el-Rayyes Books, 1991.

Amad, Rif ʿat Sayyid, al-Nabī al-musallaḥ (2): al-Ṯāʾirūn, London, Riad el-Rayyes Books, 1991.

al-Alūsī, al-Sayyid Maḥmūd, Rūḥ al-maʿānī fī tafsīr al-Qurʾān al-ʿaẓīm wa al-sabʿ al-maṯānī, Beirut, Dār Iḥyāʾ al-Turāṯ al-ʿArabī, n.d.

al-Aṣfahānī, al-Rāġib, Mufradāt alfāẓ al-Qurʾān, ed. Ṣafwān ʿAdnān Dawūdī, Damascus, Dār al-Qalam, 2nd ed., 2002.

ʿAwaḍ, Ibrāhīm, Min al-Ṭabarī ilā Sayyid Quṭb: dirāsāt fī manāhiǧ al-tafsīr wa-maḏāhibuhu, Cairo, Dār al-Fikr al-ʿArabī, 2000/1421.

al-Azhar House of Fatwā, “Imtilāk al-ummah li-l-asliḥa al-nawawiyya”, [article online]; available from http://www.onislam.net/arabic/ask-the-scholar/8363/8332/52543- 2004-08-01%2017-37-04.html; accessed 29 May, 2013.

al-Bayyūmī, Muḥammad Rajab, “al-Alūsī al-mufassir”, in Maḥmūd Ḥamdī Zaqzūq (ed.), Mawsūʿat aʿ lām al-fikr al-islāmī, Cairo, al-Maǧlis al-Aʿlā li-l-Šuʾūn al-Islāmiyya, 2007/1428, p. 13-18.

al-Daġāmīn, Ziyād Ḫalīl Muḥammad, Manhaǧiyyat al-baḥṯ fī al-tafsīr al-mawḍūʿī li-l-Qurʾān al-karīm, Amman, Dār al-Bašīr, 1995/1416.

al-Ḏahabī, Muḥammad Husayn, al-Tafsīr wa-l-mufassirūn: Baḥṯ tafṣīlī ʿan našʾat al-tafsīr wa taṭawwuru wa alwānu wa maḏāhibu maʿa ʿarḍ šāmil li-ašhar al-mufassirin wa taḥlīl kāmil li ahamm kutub al-tafsīr min ʿaṣr al-nabiyy ṣallā Allāhu ʿalayhi wa sallam ilā ʿaṣrinā al-ḥāḍir, Cairo, Dār al- Ḥadīṯ, 2005/1426.

Ḍayf, Šawqī et al., al-Muʿǧam al-wasīṭ, Cairo, Maktabat al-Šurūq al-Dawliyya, 4th ed., 2004.

al-Faramāwī, ʿAbd al-Ḥayy, al-Bidāya fī al-tafsīr al-mawḍūʿī: dirāsa manhajiyya, Cairo, N.p., 2nd ed., 1977/1397.

al-Faramāwī, ʿAbd al-Ḥayy, “al-Faḫr al-Rāzī”, in Maḥmūd Ḥamdī Zaqzūq (ed.), Mawsūʿat aʿ lām al-fikr al-islāmī, Cairo: al-Maǧlis al-Aʿlā li-l-Šuʾūn al-Islāmiyya, 2007/1428, p. 793-795.

al-Faramāwī, ʿAbd al-Ḥayy,“al-Qurṭubī”, in Maḥmūd Ḥamdī Zaqzūq (ed.), Mawsūʿat aʿ lām al-fikr al-islāmī, Cairo: al-Maǧlis al-Aʿlā li-l-Šuʾūn al-Islāmiyya, 2007/1428, p. 831-832.

al-Faramāwī, ʿAbd al-Ḥayy, “al-Ṭabarī”, in Maḥmūd Ḥamdī Zaqzūq (ed.), Mawsūʿat aʿ lām al-fikr al-islāmī, Cairo: al-Maǧlis al-Aʿlā li-l-Šuʾūn al-Islāmiyya, 2007/1428, p. 551-553.

Ǧād al-Ḥaqq, Ǧād al-Ḥaqq ʿAlī and Saqr, ʿAtiyya, “Naqḍ al-farīḍa al-ġāʾiba: fatwā wa munāqaša”, Supplementary book to Maǧallat al-Azhar, vol. 66, al-Muḥarram 1414/July 1993.

Ǧād al-Ḥaqq, Ǧād al-Ḥaqq ʿAlī and Saqr, ʿAtiyya, Bayān li-l-nās min al-Azhar al-šarīf, Cairo, Maṭābiʿ Wazārat al-Awqāf, n.d.

al-Ghazālī, Muḥammad, Naḥwā tafsīr mawḍūʿī li-suwar al-Qurʾān al-karīm, Cairo, Dār al-Šurūq, 4th ed., 2000/1421.

al-Ḥābīb, Muḥammad Ibn al-Ḫūǧa, al-Ǧihād fī al-islām, Tunis, al-Dār al-Tūnisiyya li-l-Našr, 1968/1386.

Ḥāfiẓ, Usāma Ibrāhīm and Muḥammad, ʿĀṣim ʿAbd al-Māǧid, Ḥurmat al-ġuluww fī al-dīn wa takfīr al-muslimīn, ed. Karam Muammad Zuhdī et al., Cairo, Maktabat al-ʿUbaykān, 2004/1425.

Ḫalīf, Fatḥallah, Faḫr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, Alexandria, Egypt, Dār al-Ǧāmiʿāt al-Miṣriyya, 1976.

Haykal, Muḥammad Khayr, al-Ǧihād wa-l-qitāl fī al-siyāsa al-šarʿiyya, Beirut, Dār al-Bayāriq, 3rd ed., 1996/1417.

al-Ḥifnī, ʿAbd al-Munʿim, Mawsūʿat al-Qurʾān al-ʿaẓīm, Cairo, Maktabat Madbūlī, 2004.

al-Ḥūfī, Aḥmad Muḥammad, al-Ṭabarī, Cairo, al-Muʾassasa al-Miṣriyya al-ʿĀmma li-l-Taʾlīf wa-l-Tarǧama wa-l-Ṭibāʿah wa-l-Nashr, 1963/1382.

Ibn Manẓūr, Ǧamāl al-Dīn Muḥammad b. Makram, Lisān al-ʿArab, Beirut, Dār Ṣādir, 6th ed., 1997/1417.

Ibn Taymiya, Aḥmad ibn ʿAbd al-Ḥalīm, Muqaddima fī uṣūl al-tafsīr, ed. ʿAdnān Zarzūr, Beirut, Dār al-Qurʾān al-Karīm, 2nd ed., 1972/1392.

Ibrāhīm, Nāǧiḥ Muḥammad, al-Ḥākimiyya: Naẓra Sharʿiyya wa Ruʾya Wāqiʿiyya, ed. Karam Muammad Zuhdī et al., Cairo: Maktabat al-ʿUbaykān, 2004/1425.

Ibrāhīm, Nāǧiḥ Muḥammad, Taṭbīq al-aḥkām min iḫtiṣās al-ḥukkām: al-ḥūdūd, iʿ lān al-ḥarb, al-ǧizya - naẓarāt fī fiqh al-taṭbīq, ed. Karam Muḥammad Zuhdī, ʿAlī Muḥammad ʿAlī al-Šarīf et al., Cairo, Maktabat al-ʿUbaykān, 2004/1425.

ʿImāra, Muḥammad, al-Farīḍa al-ġāʾiba: ʿarḍ wa ḥiwār wa taqyīm, Cairo, Dār Ṯābit, 1982/1402.

ʿImāra, Muḥammad, Hal al-islām huwa al-ḥall: limāḏā wa kayf?, Cairo, Dār al-Šurūq, 1995/1415.

ʿImāra, Muḥammad, al-Samāḥa al-islāmiyya: ḥaqīqat al-ǧihād wa-l-qitāl wa-l-irhāb, Cairo, Maktabat al-Šurūq al-Dawliyya, 2005/1426.

ʿImāra, Muḥammad, “Muḥammad ʿAbdu (al-Imām)”, in Maḥmūd Ḥamdī Zaqzūq (ed.), Mawsūʿat aʿ lām al-fikr al-islāmī, Cairo, al-Maǧlis al-Aʿlā li-l-Šuʾūn al-Islāmiyya, 2007/1428, p. 969-971.

ʿImāra, Muḥammad, “Muḥammad Rashīd Riḍā”, in Maḥmūd Ḥamdī Zaqzūq (ed.), Mawsūʿat aʿ lām al-fikr al-islāmī, Cairo, al-Maǧlis al-Aʿlā li-l-Šuʾūn al-Islāmiyya, 2007/1428, p. 946-947.

Jaʿfar, Hishām Aḥmad ʿAwaḍ, al-Abʿād al-siyāsiyya li-mafhūm al-ḥākimiyya: ruʾya maʿrifiyya, Herndon, Virginia, The International Institute of Islamic Thought, 1995/1416.

al-Maǧḏūb, ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz, al-Imām al-Ḥakīm Faḫr al-Dīn al-Rāzī min ḫilāl tafsīrihi, Tunisia, al-Dār al-ʿArabiyya li-l-Kutub, 2nd ed., 1980/1400.

Maǧmaʿ al-Luġa al-ʿArabiyya, al-Muʿ ǧam al-waǧīz, Cairo, Egyptian Ministry of Education, 1994/1415.

Mahdī, Maḥmūd, al-Šaʿrāwī mufakkiran, Cairo, Dār al-Bayān li-l-Ṭabʿ wa-l-Našr wa-l-Tawzīʿ, 2003.

Muḥammad, Muḥammad Muṣtafā, al-Fihris al-mawḍūʿī li āyāt al-Qurʾān al-karīm, Beirut, Dār al-Ǧīl, 4th ed., 1989/1409.

Muḥammad, Muḥammad Muṣtafā, “Muḥammad Mutawallī al-Šaʿrāwī”, in Maḥmūd Ḥamdī Zaqzūq (ed.), Mawsūʿat aʿ lām al-fikr al-islāmī, Cairo, al-Maǧlis al-Aʿlā li-l-Šuʾūn al-Islāmiyya, 2007/1428, p. 1003-1006.

al-Mumnī, Aḥmad Muḥammad Ḫalaf, al-Taʿ biʾa al-ǧihādiyya fī al-islām, Amman, Dār al-Arqam li-l-Našr wa al-Tawzīʿ, 1986/1406.

Munīr, Ibrāhim and al-Wāʿī, Tawfīq, Sayyid Quṭb: ṣāḥid al-ẓilāl, Kuwait, Maktabat al-Manār al-Islāmiyya, 2005/1426.

Nār, Aḥmad, al-Qitāl fī al-islām, Ḥumṣ, al-Maktaba al-Islāmiyya, 2nd ed., 1968.

al-Nimr, ʿAbd al-Munʿim, ʿ Ilm al-tafsīr: kayfa našaʾa wa-taṭawwara ḥattā intahā ilā ʿaṣrinā al-ḥāḍir, Cairo, Dār al-Kitāb al-Miṣrī, 1985/1405.

al-Qaraḍāwī, Yūsuf, al-Islām wa-l-ʿunf: naẓarāt taʾṣīliyya, Cairo, Dār al-Šurūq, 2005.

al-Qaraḍāwī, Yūsuf, Fiqh al-ǧihād: dirāsa muqārana li aḥkāmihi wa falsafatihi fī ḍawʾ al-Qurʾān wa-l-Sunna, Cairo, Maktabat Wahba, 2009/1430.

al-Qaraāwī, Yūsuf, “Kalima aīra awla Sayyid Qub”, [article online]; available from http://www.qaradawi.net/articles/86-2009-12-12-10-35-10/4143.html; accessed 29 April 2013.

al-Qaraḍāwī, Yūsuf, “Muḏakkirāt al-Qaraḍāwī: waqfa maʿa Sayyid Quṭb”, http://www.almotamar.net/news/10244.htm; accessed 29 April 2013.

al-Qarāla, ʿAlī ʿAbd al-Qādir, al-Muqāwama wa-l-irhāb min manẓūr islāmī, Amman, Dār ʿĀlam al-Ṯaqāfa li-l-Našr wa-l-Tawzīʿ, 2005.

al-Qāsimī, Ẓāfir, al-Ǧihād wa-l-ḥuqūq al-dawliyya al-ʿāmma fī al-islām, Beirut, Dār al-ʿIlm li-l-Malāyīn, 1982.

al-Qurṭubī, Muḥammad ibn Aḥmad al-Anṣārī, al-Ǧāmiʿ li aḥkām al-Qurʾān, Cairo, Dār al-Šaʿb, n.d.

al-Raḥmūnī, Muḥammad, al-Dīn wa-l-ayduyūlūjyā: ğadaliyyat al-dīnī wa al-siyāsī fī-l-islām wa fī-l-markisiyya, Beirut, Dār al-ṭalīʿa li-l-Ṭibāʿa wa-l-Našr, 2005.

al-Rāzī, Faḫr al-Dīn Muḥammad ibn ʿUmar al-Tamīmī, al-Tafsīr al-kabīr aw mafātīḥ al-ġayb, Beirut, Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, 2000.

Riḍā, Muḥammad Rashīd, Tafsīr al-Qurʾān al-ḥakīm: al-muštahir bi-ism Tafsīr al-manār, Cairo, Dār al-Manār, 2nd ed., 1947/1366.

Šaʿbān, Muṣtafā, “Abnāʾ al-ǧamāʿa al-islāmiyya al-amn qabila tawbatahum wa-l-muǧtamaʿ rafaḍahum”, [article online]; available from http://www.islamonline.net/servlet/Satellite-?c=ArticleA_C&cid=1235402630534&pagename=Zone-Arabic-Daawa%2FDWALayout; accessed 29 May 2013.

al-Šāfiʿī, Muḥammad ibn Idrīs, al-Umm, ed. Maḥmūd Maṭraǧī, Beirut, Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, 1993/1413.

Šalabī, Aḥmad, al-Ğihād wa-l-nuẓum al-ʿaskariyya fī al-tafkīr al-islāmī, Cairo, Maktabat al-Nahḍa al-Miṣriyya, 2nd ed., 1974.

al-Šarabāṣī, Aḥmad, Rashīd Riḍā: al-ṣaḥafī, al-mufassir, al-šāʿir, al-luġawī, Cairo, al-Maǧlis al-Aʿlā li-l-Šuʾūn al-Islāmiyya, 1977, p. 10-90.

al-Šaʿrāwī, Muḥammad Mutawallī, Tafsīr al-Šaʿrāwī, Cairo, Aḫbār al-Yawm, 1991.

al-Šarīf, ʿAlī Muḥammad ʿAlī and Ḥāfiẓ, Usāma Ibrāhīm, al-Nuṣḥ wa-l-tabyīn fī taṣḥīḥ mafāhīm al-muḥtasibīn, ed. Karam Muḥammad Zuhdī et al., Cairo, Maktabat al-Turāṯ al-Islāmī, 2002/1422.

Šeḥāta, ʿAbdullāh Maḥmūd, “Manḥaǧ al-imām Muḥammad ʿAbduh fī tafsīr al-Qurʾān al-karīm”, MA diss., Faculty of Dār al-ʿŪlūm, Cairo University, 1380/1960.

Spīndārī, ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-Irhāb min manẓūr qurʾānī, Kurdistan, Hawār, 2006.

al-Suyūṭī, ʿAbd al-Raḥmān ibn al-Kamāl Ǧalāl al-Dīn, Tanāsuq al-durar fī tanāsub al-suwar, ed. ʿAbd al-Qādir Aḥmad ʿAṭā, Beirut, Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, 1406/1986.

al-Ṭabarī, Muḥammad ibn Ǧarīr ibn Yazīd ibn Ḫālid, Ǧāmiʿ al-bayān ʿan taʾwīl āy al-Qurʾān, Beirut, Dār al-Fikr, 1984-5/1405.

al-Ṯaqafī, Aḥmad bin Ibrāhīm bin al-Zubayr, al-Burhān fī tanāsub suwar al-Qurʾān, ed. Saīd bin Ǧumʿa al-Fallāḥ, Saudi Arabia, Dār Ibn al-Ǧawzī, 1428.

al-Zayn, Muḥammad Bassām Rušdī, al-Muʿǧam al-mufahras li-maʿānī al-Qurʾān al-ʿaẓīm, Damascus, Dār al-Fikr, 2nd ed., 1996/1417.

al-Zuḥaylī, Wahba, Āthār al-ḥarb fī al-fiqh al-islāmī: dirāsa muqārana, Damascus, Dār al-Fikr, 3rd ed., 1998/1419.

Zuhdī, Karam Muḥammad, Tafǧīrāt al-Riyāḍ: al-aḥkām wa-l-āṯār, Cairo, Maktabat al-Turāṯ al-Islāmī, 2003/1424.

Other languages

“Dutch MP Posts Islam Film on Web”; available from http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world-/europe/7317506.html; accessed 9 March 2010.

“Response to Wilders’ Anti-Koran Film: Saudi Blogger Releases Christian Version of ‘Fitna’”; available from http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0, 1518,546534,00.html; accessed 9 June 2013.

Abdul-Raof, Hussein, The Qurʾan Outlined: Outline, Theme and Text, London, Ta-Ha Publishers, 2001.

Abdul-Raof, Hussein, Schools of Qurʾānic Exegesis: Genesis and Development, London, Routledge, 2010.

Abou El Fadl, Khaled, “Islamic Law and Muslim Minorities. The Juristic Discourse on Muslim Minorities from the Second/Eighth to the Eleventh/Seventh Centuries”, Islamic Law and Society, vol. 1, 2, 1994, p. 141-187.

Abu-Rabiʿ, Ibrahim M., Intellectual Origins of Islamic Resurgence in the Modern Arab World, Albany, State University of New York Press, 1996, p. 166-195.

Akhavi, Shahrough, “Qub, Sayyid” in Esposito, John L. (ed.), The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Modern Islamic World, New York, Oxford University Press, vol. 3, 1995, p. 400-404.

al-Ghazālī, Muammad, Thematic Commentary on the Qurʾān, trans. Ashur A. Shamis, rev. Zaynab Alawiye, Herndon, VA, International Institute of Islamic Thought, 2000/1421.

Amritha Venkatraman, “Religious Basis for Islamic Terrorism: The Quran and Its Interpretation”, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, Vol. 30, 2007, pp. 229-248.

Ashour, Omar, A World Without Jihad? The Causes of De-Radicalization of Armed Islamist Movements, Montreal, PhD Thesis, Department of Political Science, McGill University, May 2008.

Ashour, Omar, The De-Radicalization of Jihadists: Transforming Armed Islamist Movements, London, New York, Routledge, 2009.

Badawi, Elsaid M. and Abdel Haleem, Muhammad, Arabic-English Dictionary of Qurʾanic Usage, Leiden, Brill, 2008.

Bar, Zidane, Warrant for Terror: Fatwās of Radical Islam and the Duty of Jihad, Lanham, Md, Rowman & Littlefield, 2006.

BBC Arabic Website, “Fuqahāʾ Muslimūn: Qirāʾāt Fatwā Ibn Taymiyah li-l-Jihād ‘ḫāṭiʾa’”, [article online]; accessed on 22 May 2013.

Blaydes, Lisa and Rubin, Lawrence, “Ideological Reorientation and Counterterrorism: Confronting Militant Islam in Egypt”, Terrorism and Political Violence, vol. 20, 4, October 2008, p. 461-479.

Bonney, Richard, Jihād: From the Qurʾān to Bin Laden, Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2004.

Bouzentia, Iman, Anke, “The Siyar: An Islamic Law of Nations?”, Asian Journal of Social Sciences, vol. 35, 2007, p. 19-46.

Brooke, Steven, “Jihadist Strategic Debates Before 9/11”, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, vol. 31, 3, March 2008, p. 201-226.

Burgat, François, Islamism in the Shadow of al-Qaeda, trans. Patrick Hutchinson, Austin, University of Texas Press, 2008.

Chertoff, Michael, “The Ideology of Terrorism: Radicalism Revisited”, Brown Journal of World Affairs, vol. 15, 1, Fall/Winter 2008, p. 11-20.

Cozzens, Jeffrey B., “Al-Takfir waʾl Hijra: Unpacking an Enigma”, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, vol. 32, 6, June 2009, p. 489-510.

Cragg, Kenneth, “ʿAbduh, Muammad” in Esposito, John L. (ed.), The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Modern Islamic World, New York, Oxford University Press, 1995, p. 11-12.

Delcambre, Anne-Marie, Inside Islam, Milwaukee, Wisc. Marquette University Press, 2005.

el-Affendi, Abdelwahab, “The Terror of Belief and the Belief in Terror: On Violently Serving God and Nation” in Al-Rasheed, Madawi and Shterin, Marat Marat (eds.), Dying for Faith: Religiously Motivated Violence in the Contemporary World, London, I.B. Tauris, 2009, p. 59-75.

el-Awaisi, Abd al-Fattah, “The Conceptual Approach of the Egyptian Muslim Brothers Towards the Palestine Question, 1928-1949”, Journal of Islamic Studies, vol. 2, 2, 1991, p. 123-137.

el-Tahir el-Mesawi, Mohamed, “From al-Shāibī’s Legal Hermeneutics to Thematic Exegesis of the Qurʾān”, Intellectual Discourse, Vol. 20, 2, 2012.

Eltigani, Abdulqadir Hamid, “The Concept of Reform in the Qurʾān” in Khaleel, Mohammed and Rippin, Andrew, eds., Coming to Terms with the Qurʾān. A Volume in Honor of Professor Issa Boullata, McGill University, North Haledon, N.J., Islamic Publications International, 2008, p. 3-32.

Esposito, John L., Unholy War: Terror in the Name of Islam, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2002.

Fekete, Liz, “The Muslim Conspiracy Theory and the Oslo Massacre”, Race & Class, vol. 53, 3, January-March 2012, p. 30-47.

Gätje, Helmut, The Qurʾān and Its Exegesis. Selected Texts with Classical and Modern Muslim Interpretations, Oxford, One world, 1996.

Gunaratna, Rohan and Bin Ali, Mohamed, “De-Radicalization Initiatives in Egypt: A Preliminary Insight”, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, vol. 32, 4, April 2009, p. 277-291.

Habeck, Mary R., Knowing the Enemy: Jihadist Ideology and the War on Terror, New Haven, Yale University Press, 2006.

Haleem, M. A. S. Abdel, The Qur’an: A New Translation, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2005.

Hallaq, Wael B., “Was the Gate of Ijtihād Closed ?”, International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, vol. 16, 1, March 1984, p. 3-41.

Hamidullah, Muammad, The Battlefields of the Prophet Muhammad, with Maps, Illustrations and Sketches: A Contribution to Muslim Military History, New Delhi, Kitab Bhavan, 2003.

Heneghan, Tom, “Muslim Scholars Recast Jihadists’ Favorite Fatwa”, [article online]; available from http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSLDE62T2AC; accessed 22 May 2013.

Jansen, Johannes J. G., The Interpretation of the Koran in Modern Egypt, Leiden, Brill, 1974.

Jansen, Johannes J. G., “The Creed of Sadat’s Assassins: The Contents of ‘The Forgotten Duty’ Analysed”, Die Welt des Islams, New Series, vol. 25, 1/4, 1985, p. 1-30.

Jansen, Johannes J. G., The Neglected Duty. The Creed of Sadat’s Assassins and Islamic Resurgence in the Middle East, New York: Macmillan, 1986.

Kelsay, John, Arguing the Just War in Islam, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 2007.

Kenney, Jeffrey T., Muslim Rebels. Kharijites and the Politics of Extremism in Egypt, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2006.

Kepel, Gilles, The War for Muslim Minds. Islam and the West, trans. Pascale Ghazaleh, Cambridge, Mass, The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2004.

Kepel, Gilles, Beyond Terror and Martyrdom. The Future of the Middle East, trans. Pascale Ghazaleh, Cambridge, Mass, The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2008.

Khadduri, Majid, “Islam and the Modern Law of Nations”, American Journal of International Law, vol. 50, 2, April 1956, p. 358-372.

Khatab, Sayed, “Hakimiyyah and Jahiliyyah in the Thought of Sayyid Qutb,” Middle Eastern Studies, vol. 38, 3, July 2002, p. 145-170.

Khir, Bustami, The Concept of Sovereignty in Modern Islamic Political Thought, Leeds, Leeds Institute for Middle Eastern Studies, 1996.

Knysh, Alexander D., “Power and Impotence” in McAuliffe, Jane Dammen (ed.), The Encyclopaedia of the Qurʾān, Leiden, Brill, 2004, p. 210-213.

Lacroix, Stéphane, “Ayman Al-Zawahiri, Veteran of Jihad”, in Kepel, Gilles and Milelli, Jean-Pierre, eds., Al-Qaeda in Its Own Words, trans. Pascale Ghazaleh, Cambridge, Mass., Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2008.

Lawrence, Bruce B., Defenders of God. The Fundamentalist Revolt Against The Modern Age, San Francisco, Harper & Row, 1989.

Madawi, Al-Rasheed, “The Quest to Understand Global Jihad: The Terrorism Industry and Its Discontents”, Middle Eastern Studies, vol. 45, 2, March 2009, p. 329-338.

Malik, S.K., The Quranic Concept of War, Lahore, Wajidalis, 1979.

Martin, Liam and Smith, M.L.R., “Every Kingdom Divided Against Itself Will Be Ruined: A Reflection, a Deflection, and a Qualified Reinterpretation of the Global Jihad”, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, vol. 34, 9, September 2011, p. 672-695.

Mériboute, Zidane, Islam’s Fateful Path: The Critical Choices Facing Modern Muslims, trans. John King, London, I.B. Tauris, 2009.

Migaux, Philippe, “The Roots of Islamic Radicalism”, in Gérard Chaliand and Arnaud Blin (eds.), The History of Terrorism: From Antiquity to al Qaeda, trans. Edward Schneider, Kathryn Pulver, and Jesse Browner, Berkeley, Calif.; London: University of California Press, 2007, p. 255-314.

Musallam, Adnan A., From Secularism to Jihad: Sayyid Qutb and the Foundations of Radical Islamism, Westport, Conn, Praeger, 2005.

Nawas, John, “Badr” in McAuliffe, Jane Dammen (ed.), The Encyclopaedia of the Qurʾān, Leiden, Brill, 2006, vol. 1, p. 196-197.

Nayed, Aref Ali, “The Radical Qurʾānic Hermeneutics of Sayyid Qub”, Islamic Studies, vol. 31, 3, autumn 1413/1992, p. 355-363.

Nettler, Ronald L., “Guidelines for the Islamic Community: Sayyid Qutb’s Political Interpretation of the Qurʾān”, Journal of Political Ideologies, vol. 1, 2, 1996, p. 183-196.

Nielsen, Jørgen S., “The Discourse of ‘Terrorism’ Between Violence, Justice and International Order” in Abbas, Tahir (ed.), Islamic Political Radicalism. A European Perspective, Edinburgh, Edinburgh University Press, 2007, p. 15-24.

Parvin, Manoucher and Sommer, Maurie, “Dar al-Islam. The Evolution of Muslim Territoriality and Its Implications for Conflict Resolution in the Middle East”, International Journal of Middle East Studies, vol. 11, 1, February 1980, p. 1-21.

Perry, Marvin and Negrin, Howard E. (eds.), “Al-Qaeda: Activating Jihadism” in The Theory and Practice of Islamic Terrorism. An Anthology, New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2008.

Peters, Rudolph, Jihad in Classical and Modern Islam: A Reader, Princeton, Markus Wiener Publishers, 2nd, 2005.

Pink, Johanna, “Tradition and Ideology in Contemporary Sunnite Qurʾan Exegesis: Qurʾanic Commentaries from the Arab World, Turkey and Indonesia and Their Interpretation of Q 5: 51”, Die Welt Des Islams 50, 2010, p. 3-59.

Porter, J.M.B., “Osama Bin-Laden, Jihād, and the Sources of International Terrorism”, Indiana International and Comparative Law Review, vol. 13, 3, 2002-2003, p. 871-885.

Post, Jerrold M., “Reframing of Martyrdom and Jihad and the Socialization of Suicide Terrorists”, Political Psychology, vol. 30, 3, 2009, p. 381-385.

Roshandel, Jalil and Chadha, Sharon, Jihad and International Security, New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2006.

Schöller, Marco, “Naīr (Banū al-)” in McAuliffe, Jane Dammen (ed.), The Encyclopaedia of the Qurʾān, Leiden, Brill, 2003, vol. 3, p. 498-499.

Schöller, Marco, “Qaynuqāʿ (Banū)” in McAuliffe, Jane Dammen (ed.), The Encyclopaedia of the Qurʾān, Leiden, Brill, 2004, vol. 4, p. 323-325.

Schwartz-Barcott, T.P., War, Terror and Peace in the Qurʾan and in Islam: Insights for Military and Government Leaders, Carlisle, PA, Army War College Foundation Press, 2004.

Scott, Rachel, “An ‘Official’ Islamic Response to the Egyptian al-Jihād Movement”, Journal of Political Ideologies, vol. 8, 1, February 2003, p. 39-61.

Shah Bin Jani, Mohammed, “Sayyid Qub’s View of Jihād: An Analytical Study of His Major Works”, PhD Thesis, Department of Theology, Islamic Studies, Faculty of Arts, University of Birmingham, United Kingdom, 1998.

Siddiqi, Muzammil, “How Islam Views Possession of Nukes”, [article online]; available from https://www.onislam.net/english/ask-the-scholar/international-relations-and-jihad/relations-during-peace/175739.html; accessed 29 May 2013.

Sivan, Emmanuel, Radical Islam. Medieval Theology and Modern Politics, New Haven, Conn. and London, Yale University Press, 1990.

Soage, Ana Belén, “Rashīd Rida’s Legacy”, The Muslim World, vol. 98, 1, January 2008, p. 1-23.

Soage, Ana Belén,asan al-Bannā and Sayyid Qub: Continuity or Rupture?”, The Muslim World, vol. 99, 2, April 2009, p. 294-311.

The Mardin Conference, “The New Mardin Declaration”, [article online], available from http://www.kalamresearch.com/publications/23-the-mardin-conference.html, accessed 20 May 2013.

Tyler, John, “The Opportunity Geert Wilders Has Waited for”, [article online]; available from http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/8549155.stm; accessed 9 June 2013;

Wilders, “Quran license to Kill”; available from http://www.liveleak.com/view?i=7d9-_1206624103, accessed 27 March 2008.

Zimmerman, John C., “Sayyid Qutb’s Influence on the 11 September Attacks”, Terrorism and Political Violence, vol. 16, 2, Summer 2004, p. 222-252.

Top of page

Notes

1 Schwartz-Barcott, War, Terror and Peace in the Qurʾan and in Islam, p. 2-4.

2 According to Habeck, “based on one verse in the Quran [i.e. Qurʾan 8: 60] as well as few ahadith, the jihadis are convinced that creating fear in the hearts of the unbelievers is not only a sound tactic in their war, but one that is supported by Islamic law”, Habeck, Knowing the Enemy, p. 132.

3 Sometimes referred to as theGroupin this paper. The reason for specifically referring to the Group in Egypt is because it is probably one of the few groups that depend mainly on dogmatic religious understanding in formulating their view. See, el-Affendi, “The Terror of Belief and the Belief in Terror”, p. 74. According to Omar Ashour, “in 2000s, it [the de-radicalization process] took place in several other Muslim-majority countries, albeit on a smaller scale than in Egypt and Algeria. These de-radicalization cases include Libyan, Saudi, Yemeni, Jordanian, Tajik, Malaysian and Indonesian armed Islamist groups, factions and individuals”. Ashour, The De-Radicalization of Jihadists, p. 2. According to Gunaratna and Bin Ali, “although it is a long way for Egypt to reform the ideological orientation of the militants, Egypt’s counter-radicalization program is the first and the most extensive of any Arab country”. Gunaratna and Bin Ali, “De-Radicalization Initiatives in Egypt”, p. 280 f. See also, Brooke, “Jihadist Strategic Debates before 9/11”, p. 202.

4 Spindārī, al-Irhāb min manẓūr qurʾānī, p. 34.

5 Martin and Smith, Every Kingdom Divided Against Itself Will Be Ruined”, p. 674. All renderings of Arabic texts are my own.

6 Wilders published a film on the Internet under the title “Quran License to Kill”. The film was later removed from the website after it sparked huge anger among Muslims. The researcher watched this movie before it was removed. See, Quran License to Kill <http://www.liveleak.com/view?i=7d9_1206624103> accessed on March 27, 2008. See also, Dutch MP Posts Islam Film on Web <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/7317506.html> accessed on March 9, 2010.

7 “Response to Wilders’ Anti-Koran Film: Saudi Blogger Releases Christian Version of ‘Fitn”, <http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,546534,00.html> accessed on June 9, 2013.

8 According to John Tyler, “a party that calls Islam a backward religion, wants a ban on headscarves in public life and has compared the Koran to Hitler’s Mein Kampf has made major gains in local elections in the Netherlands”. “The Opportunity Geert Wilders Has Waited for” <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi-/world/europe/8549155.stm> accessed on June 9, 2013. See also, Fekete, “The Muslim Conspiracy Theory and the Oslo Massacre”, p. 36.

9 Nielsen, “The Discourse of ‘Terrorism’ Between Violence, Justice and International Order”, p. 17.

10 In many occurrences, reaching a comprehensive understanding of some verses cannot be done except through reference to others. According to Ibn Taymiyya (661-728/1263-1328), “the Qurʾan explicates the Qurʾan”. Ibn Taymiyya, Muqaddimah fī uṣūl al-tafsīr, p. 93. See also, el-Mesawi, “From al-Shāibī’s Legal Hermeneutics to Thematic Exegesis of the Qurʾan”, p. 205; Eltigani, “The Concept of Reform in the Qurʾan”, p. 4.

11 For a biography of al-abarī and his exegesis, see, for example, al-Faramāwī, “al- abarī”, p. 551-553; Amad Mummad al-ūfī “al-abarī”, p. 31-179; ʿAwa, Min al-Ṭabarī ilā Sayyid Quṭb, p. 9-69; Gätje, The Qurʾan and Its Exegesis: Selected Texts with Classical and Modern Muslim Interpretations, p. 34 f.; Šiāta, ʿ Ulūm al-tafsīr, p. 176-183.

12 For a biography of al-Rāzī and his exegesis, see, for example, al-Maǧdūb, al-Imām al-akīm Faḫr al-Dīn al-Rāzī min ḫilāl tafsirihi, p. 12-62; alāf, Faḫr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, p. 4-49; al-Faramāwī, “al- Far al-Rāzī”, p. 793-795.

13 For a biography of al-Qurubī and his exegesis, see, for example, al-Faramāwī, “al- Qurubī”, p.h831 f.; Šiāta, ʿUlūm al-Tafsīr, p. 192-194.

14 For a biography of al-Alūsī and his exegesis, see al-Bayyūmī, “al-Alūsī al-Mufassir”, p. 13-18; al-Nimr, ʿ Ilm al-tafsīr: kayfa našaʾa wa taṭawwara, p. 103; al-ahabī, al-Tafsīr wa-l-mufassirūn, vol. 1, p. 300-308.

15 For a biography of ʿAbdu, see, for example, Cragg, “ʿAbdū, Muammad”, vol. 1, p. 11 f.; ʿImāra, “Muammad Abdu (al-Imām)”, p. 969-971; Šiāta, Manhaǧ al-Imām Muḥammad Abdu fī tafsīr al-Qurʾān al-karīm, p. 3-30; al-ahabī, al-Tafsīr wa-l-mufassirūn, vol. 2, p. 483-504. See also, Baljon, Modern Muslim Koran Interpretation, p. 4 f.; Jansen, The Interpretation of the Koran in Modern Egypt, p. 18-34.

16 For a biography of Ria, see, for example, ʿImāra, “Muammad Rašīd Ria”,p. 946 f.; Širbāsī, Rašīd Riḍa: al-ṣaḥafī, al-mufassir, al-šāʿ ir, al-luġawī, p. 10-90; al-ʿAdawi, Rašīd Riḍa: al-Imām al-muǧāhid, p. 208-214; Soage, “Rashid Rida’s Legacy”, p. 1-23; al-ahabī, al-Tafsīr wal-mufassirūn, vol. 2, p. 505-517.

17 For a biography of Qub and his exegesis, see for example, Akhavi, Qub, Sayyid, vol. 3, p. 400-404; Nayed, “The Radical Qurʾanic Hermeneutics of Sayyid Qub”, vol. 31, p. 355-363; Nettler, “Guidelines for the Islamic Community: Sayyid Qutb’s Political Interpretation of the Qurʾan”, vol. 1, p. 183-196; Zimmerman, “Sayyid Qutb’s Influence on the 11 September Attacks”, p. 222-252; Abū Rabīʿ, Intellectual Origins of Islamic Resurgence in the Modern Arab World, p. 166-195.

18 For a biography of al-Šaʿrāwī and his exegesis, see, for example, “al-Bayyūmī, Muammad Mutawallī al-Šaʿrāwī”, p. 1003-1006; Jansen, The Neglected Duty: The Creed of Sadat’s Assassins and Islamic Resurgence in the Middle East, p. 121-150; Mahdī, al-Šaʿrāwī mufakkiran, p. 12-15.

19 For the various types of Qurʾanic exegesis and their definitions, see Abdul-Raof, Schools of Qurʾanic Exegesis, p. 92-98.

20 According to al-Faramāwī, al-Rāzi’s focus on thematic exegesis at that time was an interest that did not reach the level of a clear methodology but was rather a brief theme noticeable in his exegesis. See al- Faramāwī, al-Bīdāya fī al-tafsīr al-mawḍūʿī, p. 55. However, al-Daġamīn states that his exegesis bears strong relevance to thematic exegesis. See al-Daġamīn, Manhaǧiyyat al-baḥṯ fī al-tafsīr al-mawḍūʿī, p. 98 f.

21 Pink, “Tradition and Ideology in Contemporary Sunnite Qurʾan Exegesis”, p. 8.

22 Al-Azhar, according to Jansen, is “…traditionally regarded as the intellectual bulwark of Islam” and “…is definitely the top of a large pyramid of religious Islamic instruction which encompasses Muslims all over the world”, Jansen, The Neglected Duty, p. xviii, 36 f. Esposito regards al-Azhar University as, “…the Islamic world’s oldest and most prestigious religious school”, Esposito, Unholy War: Terror in the Name of Islam, p. 18.

23 For a comprehensive account of this important battle in Islamic history see Hamidullah, The Battlefields of the Prophet Muhammad, with Maps, Illustrations and Sketches, p. 22-42; Nawas, “Badr”, p. 196 f.

24 Al-abarī, Ǧāmiʿ al-bayān ʿan taʾwīl āyāt al-Qurʾān, vol. 9, p. 172 f. See also, al-Ġazālī, Naḥwa tafsīr mawḍūʿ ī li-suwar al-Qurʾān al-karīm, p. 127; idem, Thematic Commentary on the Qurʾan, p. 160.

25 Q 8: 1-4.

26 Q 8: 72-75.

27 Al-Alūsī, Rūḥ al-maʿānī fī tafsīr al-Qurʾan al-ʿaẓīm, vol. 10, p. 41.

28 Al-Suyūī, Tanāsuq al-durar fī tanāsub al-suwar, p. 88-91. See also, al-aqafī, āl-Burhān fī tanāsub suwar al-Qurʾān, p. 103-107.

29 Ibid., p. 89.

30 Qub, ilāl al-Qurʾān, vol. 3, p. 1580-1582; idem, In the Shade of the Qurʾan, vol. 8, p. 24 f.

31 Qub, ilāl, vol. 3, p. 1588 f.; idem, In the Shade, vol. 8, p. 41.

32 Qub, Fī ẓilāl, vol. 3, p. 1589-1592; idem, In the Shade, vol. 8, p. 41-46. See also, Bin Jani, Sayyid Qutb’s View of Jihad, p. 301-304.

33 Burgat, Islamism in the Shadow of al-Qaeda, p. 104; Bonney, Jihad: From the Qurʾan to Bin Laden, p. 219; Roshandel and Chadha, Jihad and International Security, p. 63; Nettler, “Guidelines for the Islamic Community”, vol. 1, no. 2, 1996, p. 189.

34 According to al-Zuaylī, this dichotomous classification is postulated by the majority of classical Muslim jurists. Only the Šafiʿīs introduce a third classification: dār al-ṣulḥ or dār al-ʿahd (territory of treaty), where non-Muslims offer to sign a peaceful agreement with Muslims in return for paying land tax. See: al-Zuhaylī, Aṯār al-ḥarb fī al-fiqh al-islāmī, p. 168, 175. For al-Šāfiʿī’s definition of dār al-ṣulḥ, see al-Šāfiʿī, al-Umm, p. 258.

35 Because it is beyond the scope and capacity of this article to cite and then evaluate all the classical and modern definitions of dār al-islām and dār al-ḥarb, it is helpful to mention Haykal’s definition of dār al-islām: “The country where the dominant ruling system is the Muslim rule. At the same time, the internal and external security systems are in the hands of Muslims even if non-Muslims help them to establish this security as long as their help is restricted to the minimal level.” Haykal, al-Ǧihād wa al-qitāl fī al-siyāsa al-šarʿiyya, vol. 1, p. 669.

36 According to Haykal, dār al-ḥarb or dār al-kufr is: “The country that is not governed by the Muslim rule even though its (internal and external) security is in their hands. Or it is governed by Muslim rule but its security is not in their hands. Or neither its rule not its security is in the hands of Islam and Muslims.” Ibid., vol. 1, p. 677. The reason for citing Haykal’s definitions here is that he carried out an outstanding survey of most classical and modern definitions of dār al-islām and dār al-ḥarb, evaluated them, and came up with his own definition. Ibid., vol. 1, p. 660-677. See also, Parvin and Sommer, “Dar al-Islam: The Evolution of Muslim Territoriality and Its Implications for Conflict Resolution in the Middle East”, p. 3; Abou El Fadl, “Islamic Law and Muslim Minorities”, p. 162; Khadduri, “Islam and the Modern Law of Nations”, p. 359; Bouzentia, “The Siyar: An Islamic Law of Nations?”, p. 20.

37 Bin Jani, Sayyid Qutb’s View of Jihad, p. 346.

38 Kepel, Beyond Terror and Martyrdom, p. 161.

39 Al-Qaraāwī, “almotamar.net”, <http://www.almotamar.net/news/10244.htm> accessed on April29, 2013. See also, Musallam, From Secularism to Jihad: Sayyid Qutb and the Foundations of Radical Islamism, p. 178 f., 230.

40 Al-Qaraāwī, “Kalima aīra awla Sayyid Qub”, <http://www.qaradawi.net/articles/86-2009-12-12-10-35-10/4143.html>; accessed on April 29, 2013. See also, Soage, “asan al-Bannā and Sayyid Qub: Continuity or Rupture?”, p. 295.

41 For details of the dramatic historical events Egypt witnessed at that time, see, for example, Kenney, Muslim Rebels: Kharijites and the Politics of Extremism in Egypt, p. 117-145; Sivan, Radical Islam, p. 107-129; Ashour, The De-Radicalization of Jihadists, p. 40-44.

42 Riā, Tafsīr al-Qurʾān al-akīm: āl-muštahir bi-ism Tafsīr al-Manār, vol. 9, p. 581; Qub, In the Shade, vol. 7, p. 2.

43 Abdul-Raof, The Qurʾan Outlined: Outline, Theme and Text, p. 27.

44 According to el-Mesawi, “Madinan revelations must be seen as a continuation and elaboration of Makkan ones. Similarly, later revelations in each category must be seen as confirmation, prolongation or elaboration of those preceding them”: el-Mesawi, “From al-Shāibī’s legal hermeneutics”, p. 203.

45 For more information on the nature of the conflict between Muammad and these Jewish tribes see Schöller, “Qaynuqāʿ (Banū)”, vol. 4, p. 323-325; idem, “Naīr (Banū al-)”, vol. 3, p. 498 f.; idem, “Quraya (Banū al-)”, vol. 4, p. 333-335.

46 Al-abarī, Ǧāmiʿ al-bayān, vol. 10, p. 25-29; al-Rāzī, al-Tafsīr al-kabīr aw mafātīḥ al-ġayb, vol. 15, p. 145-148; al-Qurubī, al-ǧāmiʿ lī aḥkām al-Qurʾān, vol. 8, p. 29-35; al-Alūsī, Rūḥ al-maʿānī, vol. 10, p. 21-24; Riā, Tafsīr al-Qurʾān al-ḥakīm, vol. 10, p. 54-68; Qub, In the Shade, vol. 7, p. 152-155; al-Šaʿrāwī, Tafsīr, vol. 8, p. 4767-4775. See also, Nielsen, The Discourse of ‘Terrorism’, p. 17; al-ifnī, Mawsūʿat al-Qurʾān al-ʿ aẓīm, vol. 2, p. 1880; ʿImāra, al-Samāḥa al-islāmiyya, p. 79.

47 Translation of Qurʾanic verses are taken from M.A.S Abdel Haleem’s translation.

48 Abdel Haleem, The Qurʾan: A New Translation, p. 114.

49 Knysh, “Power and Impotence”, vol. 4, p. 210.

50 Ibn Manūr, Lisān al-ʿArab, vol. 15, p. 206-209; al-Afahānī, Mufradāt alfāẓ al-Qurʾān, p. 693 f.; ʿAbd al-Bāqī, al-Muʿǧam al-mufahras li-alfāẓ al-Qurʾān al-karīm, p.587 f.; Badawi and Abdel Haleem, Arabic-English Dictionary of Qurʾānic Usage, p. 787 f.; al-Zayn, al-Muʿǧam al-mufahras li-maʿānī al-Qurʾān al-ʿaẓīm, vol. 2, p. 968 f.

51 Ibn Manūr, Lisān, vol. 15, p. 210-212.

52 Badawi and Abdel Haleem, Dictionary of Qurʾanic Usage, p. 26, 97, 533, 617, 673, 867, 891.

53 Ibid., p. 551-553.

54 Knysh, Power and Impotence, p. 210-213.

55 Ribāṭ, which is originally derived from the root r.b.ṭ (tie or to bind), literally refers to the place where horses are usually tethered to protect the Muslim frontiers, to horses themselves, and to places used for accommodation by poor Sufis in ancient times. According to al-Afahānī, ribāṭ has two meanings in the Qurʾān: first, ribāṭ al-ḫayl (warhorses), as in Q 3: 200; 8: 60. Second, ribāṭ al-nafs (self-control) as in Q 8: 11; 18: 14; 28: 10. Al-Afahānī, Mufradāt alfāẓ, p. 338. Al-Ramūnī states that, “like jihad, the word ribāṭ carries various meanings, although it is widely attached to ribāṭ al-ḫayl. al-Ramūnī, al-Dīn wa-l-ayduyūlūjyā: ğadaliyyat al-dīnī wa al-siyāsī fī-l-islām wa fī-l-markisiyya, p. 52. See also, Maǧmaʿ al-Luġa al-ʿArabiyya, al-Muʿǧam al-waǧīz, p. 252; ayf et al., al-Muʿǧam al-waṣīṭ, p. 323; Ibn al-ūǧa, al-Gihād fī al-islām, p. 32; Muammad, al-Fihris al-mawḍūʿ ī li āyāt al-Qurʾān al-karīm, p. 335.

56 Abū Dawūd, Sunan Abū Dawūd, no. 2514, in Mawsūʿat al- ḥadīth al-šarīf: al-kutub al-sitta, p. 1409.

57 Al-abarī, Ǧāmiʿ al-bayān, vol. 10, p. 30-32.

58 Al-Rāzī, Mafātīḥ al-ġayb, vol. 15, p. 148.

59 See, for example, Maǧmaʿ al-Luġa al-ʿArabiyya, al-Muʿǧam al-waǧīz, p. 217; ayf et al. al-Muʿǧam al-wasīṭ, p. 266.

60 Al-Qurubī, al-Ǧāmiʿ, vol. 8, p. 35-37.

61 Al-Alūsī, Rūḥ al-maʿ ā, vol. 10, p. 24.

62 Riā, Tafsīr al-qurʾān al-ḥakīm, vol. 10, p. 69.

63 Ibid., vol. 7, p. 499. See also al-Daġāmīn, Manhaǧiyyat al-bahṯ fī al-tafsīr al-mawḍūʿī, p. 20.

64 Qub, ilāl, vol. 3, p. 1543; idem, In the Shade, vol. 7, p. 185, p. 1588 f.

65 Literally, ḥākimiyya (legal and governmental authority, sovereignty) is a verbal noun derived from the Qurʾānic term ḥukm (legal ruling). Technically, it refers to God being the Supreme Legislator in legal and political authority. According to Khatab, “Qutb derived his concept of ḥakimiyya from the comprehensive Islamic conception of what he repeatedly called al-waḥda al-kubrā (the great unity). To Qutb, all the teachings of Islam go back to this great principle from which all Islamic theories, laws, commandments, provisions for worship, social relations are derived”. Khatab, Hakimiyyah and Jahiliyyah in the Thought of Sayyid Qutb, p. 151. According to Nettler, “It [Ḥākimiyya] conveyed perfectly his [Qub’s] conception of Islam as a polity and society under God’s sovereignty; it also conveyed Qutb’s absolute rejection of ‘Muslim’ rulers and régimes who did not govern in God’s way”. Nettler, “Qutb’s Political Interpretation of the Qurʾan”, p. 189; Ǧaʿfar, al-Abʿād al-siyāsiyya li-mafhūm al-ḥākimiyya: ruʾya maʿrifiyya, p. 22-29; Khir, The Concept of Sovereignty in Modern Islamic Political Thought, p. 180-183.

66 Qub, ilāl, vol. 3, p. 1544; In the Shade, vol. 7, p. 186.

67 Bin Jani, Sayyid Qutb’s View of Jihad, p. 362.

68 Ibid.

69 According to Omar Ashour, the origins of Jihadism go back to Egypt in the late 1960s and 1970s. The ideology was partially built on an interpretation of the writings of Sayyid Qub, a prominent Islamist intellectual”. Ashour, A World Without Jihad?: The Causes of De-Radicalization of Armed Islamist Movements, p. 162.

70 Amad, al-Nabī al-musallaḥ (1): al-Rāfiḍūn, vol. 1, p. 57, 117, 123, 129, 132, 141, 169; idem, al- Nabī al-musallaḥ (2): al-Ṯāʾirūn, vol. 2, p. 66, 162, 167, 173, 248, 259, 280, 297; Scott, “An ‘Official’ Islamic Response to the Egyptian al-Jihad Movement”, p. 48.

71 Indeed, the views of Qub have had their influence not only on Egypt but also on other countries such as Lebanon and Palestine. Esposito, Unholy War, p. 62.

72 Sometimes translated ‘The Hidden Imperative’ although the translation cited in the body of the text is the most common one. Kepel, The Roots of Radical, p. 200.

73 For limitation purposes, the literature of the Islamic Group in Egypt with reference to the Neglected Duty will only be highlighted here. It is also worth mentioning that various other extremist groups have adopted violence in the name of Islam to achieve political objectives inside and outside Egypt. Al-ʿAwwā, al-Ǧamāʿa al-islāmiyya, p. 24-27; Cozzens, “al-Takfir wa’l Hijra: Unpacking an Enigma”, p. 489-510.

74 In the remaining part of this paper, the Neglected Duty or al-Farīḍa al-Ġāʾiba will be referred to as the Farīḍa.

75 According to Kelsay, the translated title, which suggests the omission or absence of jihad, is a reference to the fact that such negligence is itself a sinful act. Kelsay, Arguing the Just War in Islam, p. 133.

76 Jansen, The Neglected Duty, p. 1 f.; idem, “The Creed of Sadat’s Assassins: The Contents of ‘The Forgotten Duty’ Analysed”, p. 1; Lawrence, Defenders of God: The Fundamentalist Revolt Against The Modern Age, p. 213.

77 Jansen, The Neglected Duty, p. 159-230.

78 Ibid., p. 167.

79 Ibid., p. 169.

80 Jansen, The Creed of Sadat’s Assassins, p. 30; Scott, An ‘Official’ Islamic Response, p. 39.

81 ʿImāra, al-Farīḍa al-ġāʾiba: ʿarḍ wa ḥiwār wa taqyīm, p. 9; Jansen, The Neglected Duty, p. 166.

82 A town located in southeastern Turkey.

83 Yasa is a mixture of the beliefs adopted by Genghis Khan, Judaism, Christianity and Islam. ʿImāra, al-Farīḍa al-ġāʾiba, p. 9, 33. According to Kepel, only very limited information is available about the yasa, apart from some “…fragments reported by rather unreliable Muslim authors”. Kepel, The Roots of Radical, p. 203, n. 1.

84 ʿImāra, al-Farīḍa al-ġāʾiba, p. 9; ʿAbd al-āliq, al-Manẓūr al-dīnī wa-l-qānūnī li-ǧarāʾim al-irhāb, p. 92-95.

85 ʿImāra, al-Farīḍa al-ġāʾiba, p. 9 f.

86 “The New Mardin Declaration”, <http://www.kalamresearch.com/publications/23-the-mardin-conference.html > accessed on 20 May 2013.

87 Ibid.; importantly, the recommendations of this timely peace summit were reflected in major Western media outlets. See, for example, “Muslim Scholars Recast Jihadists’ Favourite Fatwa”, <http://www.-reuters.com/article/idUSLDE62T2AC> accessed on 22 May 2013; “FuqahāʾMuslimūn: Qirāʾāt fatwā Ibn Taymiyya li-l-jihād ‘āiʾa’”, < http://www.bbc.co.uk/arabic/worldnews/2010/03-/100331_mardin-_fatwa_jihad_tc2.shtml >; accessed on 22 May 2013.

88 ʿImāra, al-Farīḍa al-ġāʾiba, p. 33 f.

89 Ibid., p. 47.

90 Jansen, The Neglected Duty, p. 168, 170, 172, 174, 175, 176, 177, 179, 180, 181, 192, 207, 215, 216; al-Qaraāwī, al-Islām wa-l-ʿunf, p. 45; idem, al-Qaraāwī, Fiqh al-ǧihād, vol. 2, p. 1032; Kenney, Muslim Rebels, p. 135; Brooke, Jihadist Strategic Debates, p. 206.

91 ʿImāra, al-Farīḍa al-ġāʾiba, p. 9.

92 For one of the very few references to Qub in the Farīḍa; Jansen, The Neglected Duty, p. 226.

93 Al-ʿAwwā, al-Ǧamāʿa al-islāmiyya, p. 24.

94 Taḥrīr al-Quds (liberating Jerusalem) is mentioned in the Farīḍa. ʿImāra, al-Farīḍa al-ġāʾiba, p. 23.

95 Ibid., p. 23 f.

96 Faraǧ was an electrician with only shallow theological knowledge. Kepel, The Roots of Radical, p. 12.

97 Jansen, The Neglected Duty, p. 144.

98 Ibid., p. 144 f.

99 S. al-ʿAwwā attributes the failure of al-Šaʿrāwī’s initiative to the refusal of some members of the Group at that time. Al-ʿAwwā, al-Ǧamāʿa al-islāmiyya, p. 108 f. According to Omar Ashour, al-Šaʿrāwī’s initiative “…led to the sacking of General Abdul Halim Abu Musa, the [then Egyptian] interior minister behind the process”. Ashour, The De-Radicalization of Jihadists, p. 176, n. 8; idem, A World Without Jihad?, p. 196 f., n. 6, 7; Blaydes and Rubin, “Ideological Reorientation and Counterterrorism: Confronting Militant Islam in Egypt”, p. 469.

100 Ǧād al-aqq and aqr, “Naqḍ al-farīḍa al-ġāʾiba”, p. 7; Scott, An ‘Official’ Islamic Response, p. 50-55. Ǧād al-aqq presented a critical analysis, but with no direct reference to the Farīḍa, in another book: Ǧād al-aqq, Bayān li-l-nās min al-Azhar al-šarīf, vol. 1, p. 273-294.

101 Kelsay, Arguing the Just War, p. 133.

102 This, in Omar Ashour’s understanding, does not mean that the members of the Group at that time were disrespectful of al-Azhar scholars. On the contrary, The IG shows respect to many of al-Azhar scholars, going as far as choosing an Azhari Sheikh, Dr. Umar Abd al-Raman, as their Emir in the early 1980s. They have also praised al-Azhar and some of its scholars in their poems and literature. Still they have criticized and mocked many of the pro-regime Azhar scholars”. Ashour, The De-Radicalization of Jihadists, p. 167, n. 9.

103 Also referred to in Arabic as mubādarat waqf al-ʿunf (initiative to halt violence).

104 Sometimes referred to in modern Western literature as ‘ideological reorientation’. This process is considered by Blaydes and Rubin to be “…a counterterrorism approach that seeks to change core ideological or religious beliefs of the terrorist group, thus bringing the beliefs of group members in line with societal norms”. Blaydes and Rubin, “Ideological Reorientation and Counterterrorism”, p. 462.

105 Al-ʿAwwā, al-Ǧamāʿa al-islāmiyya, p. 46; Lacroix, “Ayman al-Zawahiri, Veteran of Jihad”, p. 159; Peters, Jihad in Classical and Modern Islam: A Reader, p. 180; Ashour, The De-Radicalization of Jihadists, p. 2.

106 It is not only the refutation literature that is hard to find, but also the historical background of the Group itself; Ashour, The De-Radicalization of Jihadists, p. 45.

107 Al-Šarīf and āfi, al-Nuṣḥ wa-l-tabyīn taṣḥīḥ mafāhīm al-muḥtasibīn; Zuhdī, Tafǧīrāt al-Riyāḍ: al-aḥkām wa-l-āṯār; āfi and Muammad, Ḥurmat al-ġulūw al-dīn wa takfīr al-muslimīn; Ibrāhīm, al-Ākimiyya: naẓra šarʿiyya wa ruʾya wāqiʿiyya; Ibrāhīm, Taṭbīq al-aḥkām min iḫtiṣāṣ al-ukkām.

108 The web address of the bilingual website of the Egyptian Islamic Group is: <http://www.egyig.com>; accessed on 26 May 2013.

109 “Liqāʿāt”, <http://www.egyig.com/Public/articles/interview/7/26176518.shtml>; accessed on 28 May 2013.

110 “Abnāʾ al-Ǧamāʿa al-islāmiyya. Al-Amn qabila tawbatahum wa-l-muǧtamaʿ rafaahum”, <http://www.islamonline.net/servlet/Satellite?c=ArticleA_C&cid=1235402630534&pagename=Zone-Arabic-Daawa%2FDWALayout>; accessed on 29 May 2013.

111 In Zidane’s recently published study, he refers to the fact that the Group members have distanced themselves from terrorist organizations such as al-Qaeda and have adopted a moderate approach. His deduction, however, does not depend on academic sources but on a cursory reading of an article by Derbāla, one of the leaders of the Group, in a local Arab newspaper of al-Sharq al-Awsat; an indication that al-Muraǧʿāt literature has not yet been given the attention it deserves, especially from an ideological perspective. Mériboute, Islam’s Fateful Path, p. 108, 230, n. 23, quoted in Muhammed Essam Derbala, writing in al-Sharq al-Awsat, 16 January, 2004. Bar refers to al-murāǧaʿāt very briefly. See, Bar, Warrant for Terror: Fatwas of Radical Islam and the Duty of Jihad, p. 84, n. 9. In addition to Zidane and Bar, Chertoff and Post refer to the initiative of Sayyid Imām al-Šarīf, in which the latter declared his rejection of al-Qaeda’s violence. Chertoff, “The Ideology of Terrorism: Radicalism Revisited”, p. 14; Post, Reframing of Martyrdom and Jihad and the Socialization of Suicide Terrorists”, p. 384; el-Affendi, “The Terror of Belief and the Belief in Terror”, p. 74; Peters, Jihad in Classical and Modern Islam, p. 180-183; Ashour, The De-Radicalization of Jihadists, p. 2. Apart from the above authors, it is extremely difficult to trace any reference to al-murāǧaʿāt by other Western authors such as Bonney, Kelsay, Esposito and others. See, for example, Bonney, Jihad, p. 288-292; Kelsay, Arguing the Just War, p. 130-133; Esposito, Unholy War, p. 62-64; Roshandel and Chadha, Jihad, p. 53; Kepel, The Roots of Radical, p. 199-223; Armstrong, The Battle, p. 359-363; Porter, Osama Bin-Laden, Jihād, and the Sources of International Terrorism”, p. 879; Venkatraman, Religious Basis for Islamic Terrorism: The Quran and Its Interpretation”, p. 238.

112 Ibrāhīm, al-ākimiyya, p. 103.

113 Ibid., p. 189-211.

114 Zuhdī, Tafǧīrāt al-Riyāḍ, p. 40-42.

115 Ibrāhīm, Taṭbīq al-aḥkām min iḫtiṣāṣ al-ḥukkām, p. 73.

116 Al-Šarīf and āfi, al-Nuṣḥ wa-l-tabyīn, p. 85.

117 Muammad, Ḥurmat al-ġulūw fī al-dīn, p. 100-114. Al-Qaraāwī himself has stated that, although at certain times his books were banned from being circulated among the members of the Group, with al-Murāǧaʿāt the leaders of the Group themselves cited his books at length. Al-Qaraāwī hailed this attitude by the Group calling it a sign of honesty and maturity in seeking religious knowledge. Al-Qaraāwī, Fiqh al-ǧihād: Dirāsa muqārana, vol. 1, p. 16 f., vol. 2, p. 1169.

118 Al-Qaraāwī, Fiqh al-ǧihād: dirāsa muqārana, vol. 2, p. 1168 f; idem, al-Islām wa-l-ʿunf, p. 40-58.

119 Brooke, “Jihadist Strategic Debates”, p. 207 f.

120 Al-Qaraāwī, al-Islām wa-l-ʿ unf, p. 54; Migaux, “The Roots of Islamic Radicalism”, p. 291.

121 For a confirmation of the radical views of ʿAbd al-Ramān, see for example, ʿAbd al-Ramān, “Mawqif al-Qurʾān min uūmihi kamā tuawwiruhu sūrat al-Tawba”, p. 1016-1029.

122 Ashour, The De-Radicalization of Jihadists, p. 2, 56.

123 Kepel, The Roots of Radical, p. 12. See also idem, The War for Muslim Minds: Islam and the West, p. 1. See also, al-Rasheed, “The Quest to Understand Global Jihad: The Terrorism Industry and Its Discontents”, p. 212; Perry and Negrin (eds.), Al-Qaeda: Activating Jihadism”, p. 38.

124 Chertoff, “The Ideology of Terrorism”, p. 14.

125 See, for example, Nūr, al-Qitāl fī al-Iislām p. 23-125; Al-Qaraāwī, Fiqh al-ǧihād: dirāsa muqārana, p. 533; Ibn al-ūǧa, al-Ǧihād, p. 35; al-Mumnī, al-Taʿ biʾa al-ǧihādiyya fī al-islām, p. 28-30; Šalabī, al-Ǧihād wa-l-nuẓum al-ʿaskariyya fī al-tafkīr al-islāmī, p. 54; al-ifnī, Mawsūʿat al-Qurʾān, p. 1880; al-Qarāla, al-Muqāwama wa-l-irhāb min manẓūr islāmī, p. 110; el-Awaisi, “The Conceptual Approach of the Egyptian Muslim Brothers towards the Palestine Question, 1928-1949”, p. 239; ʿImāra, Hal al-islām ẖuwa al-ḥall: limāḏā wa kayfa?; Malik, The Quranic Concept of War, p. 144.

126 Nūr, al-Qitāl, p. 23-125; al-Qāsimī, al-Ǧihād wa-l-uqūq al-dawliyya al-ʿāmma fī al-islām, p. 246.

127 Nūr, al-Qitāl, p. 26.

128 Ibid.

129 Ibid., p. 97.

130 Ibid., p. 126.

131 Indeed, el-Awaisi’s article is a very clear example of that. See el-Awaisi, “The Conceptual Approach of the Egyptian Muslim Brothers”, p. 239.

132 Al-Qaraāwī, Fiqh al-ǧihād: dirāsa muqārana, vol. 1, p. 536.

133 Ibid., vol. 1, p. 590.

134 Ibid., vol. 1, pp. 590 f.

135 “Imtilāk al-umma li-l-aslia al-nawawiyya”; <http://www.onislam.net/arabic/ask-the-scholar/8363-/8332/52543-2004-08-01%2017-37-04.html>; accessed on 29 May, 2013.

136 Delcambre, Inside Islam, p. 18.

137 “How Islam Views Possession of Nukes”, <https://www.onislam.net/english/ask-the-scholar/-international-relations-and-jihad/relations-during-peace/175739.html >; accessed on 29 May, 2013.

138 Ibid..

139 See Hallaq, “Was the Gate of Ijtihad Closed?”, p. 3 f.

140 Al-ifnī, Mawsūʿat al-Qurʾān, p. 1880.

Top of page

References

Bibliographical reference

Elsayed M. A. Amin, « From Warhorses to Warheads », MIDÉO, 31 | 2016, 83-129.

Electronic reference

Elsayed M. A. Amin, « From Warhorses to Warheads », MIDÉO [Online], 31 | 2015, Online since 14 April 2016, connection on 17 August 2017. URL : http://mideo.revues.org/571

Top of page

About the author

Elsayed M. A. Amin

ElSayed M. A. Amin, is an Assistant Professor of Islamic Studies in English at al-Azhar University’s Department of Islamic Studies in Foreign Languages, Faculty of Languages and Translation and a former Post Doctoral Fellow at the SOASCIS, Universiti Brunei Darussalam (UBD), Brunei. This research was funded by SOASCIS UBD during 2013. I am very grateful to Professor Datuk Osman Bakar, director and chair professor of SOASCIS UBD for his insightful comments upon the initial writing of this paper. I am also grateful to both Ahmad Hamza and Mahmoud Nagah, Graduate Teaching Assistants at the Department of Islamic Studies in Foreign Languages at al-Azhar University in Cairo, for revising the non-English words in this research in its final stage.

Top of page

Copyright

Institut Dominicain d'Études Orientales

Top of page
  • Logo Institut dominicain d'études orientales - IDEO
  • Logo Institut français d'archéologie orientale - IFAO
  • Revues.org